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Martin Luther King Jr.’s Perjury Trial: 
A Potential Turning Point and a Footnote to History 
 




§ 382. (5166) (7548) Perjury before state department of 
revenue 
Any witness who shall testify falsely as to any material fact 
about which he is interrogated by the department of revenue, or 
in any investigation or proceedings held before the department 
of revenue, shall be guilty of perjury, and shall, on conviction, be 
imprisoned in the penitentiary for not less than two years nor 
more than five years.1 
 
  In 1960, the state of Alabama indicted Martin Luther King, Jr. for perjury, 
based on his alleged underpayment of his state income taxes in 1956 and 1958.2 
Governor John Patterson ordered the prosecution as a tactic in his campaign of 
resistance to the Civil Rights Movement.3 While civil rights activists turned to the 
courts on occasion to advance their goals, legal strategies lay at the core of Governor 
Patterson’s effort to defeat the movement. Dr. King defined this trial as a potential 
turning point in his career as a civil rights activist.4 Convictions on both charges of 
perjury could have sent Dr. King to prison for as long as ten years, likely removing 
                                                 
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law. The author acknowledges the 
generous support from the Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Faculty Research Program. The 
author expresses his appreciation to research assistants Tal Druyan, Theo Lecszynski, Miriam Liabo, 
Michelle Shaw, and Joline Smith. The author wishes to thank Professor Jonathan Entin for his 
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1  ALA. CODE § 14-382 (1940). 
2  Edgar Dyer, A “Triumph of Justice” in Alabama: The 1960 Perjury Trial of Martin Luther King, Jr., 88 
J. AFR. AM. HIST. 245, 247 (2003). 
3  John Patterson served as Alabama Attorney General from 1955 to 1959 and as Governor from 1959 to 
1963. He began his counter campaign as Attorney General. See discussion infra Part I. 
4  Compare Martin Luther King, Jr., Foreword to WILLIAM M. KUNTSLER, DEEP IN MY HEART: THE FIRST 
PERSON STORY OF A “FREEDOM LAWYER” AND HIS BATTLES IN COUNTLESS DIXIE COURTROOMS, at xxi (1966), 
with Fred Gray, Dr. King’s first lawyer and a member of his legal team in the perjury trial, viewed this 
prosecution as the most important legal case of his career. FRED D. GRAY, BUS RIDE TO JUSTICE 108 (rev. 
ed. 2013).  
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him as a leader of the Civil Rights Movement.5 However, much to Dr. King’s surprise, 
the jury acquitted him.6 
This Article examines several key issues related to the prosecution, including 
how it came about, the extraordinary challenges it posed for Martin Luther King, Jr., 
the key question of why the jury acquitted him, and the possible implications of a 
hypothetical conviction. The discussion shows how the case could have been a major 
turning point in Dr. King’s career but instead became a footnote to the story of his 
life and to the history of the Civil Rights Movement.7   
Part I discusses the origins of the perjury trial. Section A considers the political 
and historical context that provided the backdrop for the prosecution. It introduces 
segregationist John Patterson, Alabama attorney general and then governor during 
this period, who played a central role throughout the trial. Section B shows how the 
perjury prosecution developed as an opportunistic initiative by Governor Patterson, 
as a part of his counter-campaign to defeat the Civil Rights Movement. Part II 
examines the extraordinary challenges the prosecution presented for Dr. King, 
discussing both the difficult personal threats to his core reputation for honesty, as 
well as the reasons Dr. King believed that conviction was inevitable.   
Part III explores the surprising outcome of the case—when the all-white jury 
acquitted Dr. King. The discussion suggests that the acquittal was the result of two 
converging factors. Section A considers the widely accepted explanation that fair-
minded jurors concluded that the state’s case against Dr. King was extremely weak 
and, as a result, they acquitted him. However, that section also suggests the 
problematic nature of that explanation, since it would have been such an aberrational 
event at that time and place.  
Section B describes another factor that could have contributed to the 
extraordinarily surprising verdict. This section suggests that the jurors would have 
considered a conviction to be counterproductive to the interests of the city’s white 
community. Dr. King had left Alabama and moved to Atlanta, hard-core 
segregationists had taken control of Montgomery after the bus boycott, and the 
exhausted Black community had become fractured and relatively ineffective in that 
period.8 The jurors would have decided to “let this sleeping dog lie” rather than 
                                                 
5  See discussion infra Part 1. 
6  After the acquittal on the 1956 charges, the prosecutor dropped the charges rather than proceeding 
with a second trial on the 1958 charges: “Negro integration leader Martin Luther King Jr. will not be 
prosecuted on a second count of perjury in connection with his filing state income tax returns, 
authorities said today. Circuit Solicitor William F. Thetford said King was acquitted of the first count 
‘and I don’t think this one is any better.’” King’s Perjury Retrial Dropped, WASH. POST, July 19, 1960, at 
A13. 
7  There is only one extended account of the prosecution. See Dyer, supra note 2. 
8  “Black” is capitalized wherever it refers to Black people, to indicate that Blacks, or African Americans, 
are a specific cultural group with its own history, traditions, experience, and identity—not just people 
of a particular color. Using the uppercase letter signifies recognition of the culture, as it does with 
Latinos, Asian Americans, or Native Americans. See MARTHA BIONDI, TO STAND AND FIGHT: THE 
STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN POSTWAR NEW YORK CITY (2003); Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, 







making Dr. King a martyr by convicting him, thus risking strong pushback from the 
Black community and very serious consequences for white Montgomery.9 However, it 
seems extremely unlikely that this concern would have led to acquittal if the 
prosecutor had presented a strong case of Dr. King’s guilt. The conclusion here is that 
the most plausible path to acquittal is that both factors—the state’s weak case and 
the consequentialist dangers in a conviction—were necessary, but neither was 
sufficient to produce the result.  
Finally, Part IV engages in counterfactual speculation about the possible 
implications of a conviction of Dr. King. Section A imagines the impact on Dr. King, 
and Section B considers the possible impact on the movements with which he was 
associated.  
I.   HOW THE PROSECUTION OF DR. KING HAPPENED 
A. The Context: A Counter Campaign to Defeat the Civil Rights Movement  
In 1954, John Patterson decided to run for Alabama attorney general.10 He did 
so reluctantly, having had no previous interest in giving up private law practice and 
entering public life. He chose to stand in for his father, who was murdered during his 
own campaign for Attorney General.11 The elder Patterson had run on a promise of 
cleaning up the corrupt and crime-ridden town of Phenix.12 He paid the ultimate price 
for taking on the criminals who ran the town.13 When Albert’s son replaced him on 
the ballot, he campaigned successfully on a platform of “decency.”14 That term came 
to embody two major commitments: cleaning up the town of Phenix and defeating the 
Civil Rights Movement.15 
John Patterson’s successes on those two fronts helped secure his election as 
governor, where he served from 1959 to 1964.16 During his time as attorney general, 
                                                 
Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation in Anti-Discrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1332 
n.2 (1988). 
9  Prosecutor William Thetford used this phrase. See discussion infra Part III.B.; see also infra note 74 
discussion.  
10  GENE HOWARD, PATTERSON FOR ALABAMA:  THE LIFE AND CAREER OF JOHN PATTERSON, 48–49 (2008); see 
also Alan Edwin Grady, The Campaign for Decency: John Patterson as Alabama Attorney General, 
1955–1959: A Thesis (Dec. 1992) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Univ. of Ala. in Huntsville) (on file with M. 
Louis Salmon Library, Univ. of Ala. in Huntsville). 
11  HOWARD, supra note 10, at 48–49; see also Grady, supra note 10, at 1. 
12  HOWARD, supra note 10, at 36. 
13  HOWARD, supra note 10, at 48; Grady, supra note 10, at 1, 12. 
14  See Grady, supra note 10, at 1–4. Both crime and the Civil Rights Movement posed a danger to decency 
because they threatened the order and stability of the “southern way of life.” Id. at 76–86. 
15  Id. at 1–4. 
16  In the 1958 race for governor, Patterson’s record as attorney general helped him win the day. All of the 
candidates favored segregation. However, Patterson was the only one with a proven track record of 
opposing integration. See Carl Grafton & Anne Permaloff, John. M. Patterson (1959–63), in 
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he assumed the leadership in the state’s struggle to maintain pervasive segregation 
and exclusion of Blacks from the political process.17 He retained that role in his term 
as governor.18 
Throughout his time in statewide office, John Patterson engaged in a campaign 
designed to undermine and defeat the Civil Rights movement in Alabama by 
excluding the main organizations and individual leaders and activists.19 His strategy 
for defeating the Civil Rights Movement was creative, opportunistic, and multi-
pronged. As a lawyer, he relied heavily on the legal system to accomplish his goal. 
His tactics included challenges to the operation of the NAACP in the state, the perjury 
prosecution of Martin Luther King, Jr., a libel suit against Dr. King and others, and 
condoning racial violence against Black and white “freedom riders” seeking to 
integrate interstate bus facilities.20 
As attorney general, Patterson’s first and most noteworthy success in this 
regard was in shutting down the NAACP’s operations in Alabama in 1956.21 He held 
                                                 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ALA., http://www.encyclopediaofalabama.org/article/h-1431 (last visited Sept. 26, 
2016). 
17  When John Patterson was Attorney General, the governor, Jim Folsom, was not an ardent 
segregationist. In the terminology of the time, he was a “racial moderate.” So Patterson filled the void 
of leadership in defending the status quo. See Grady, supra note 10, at 4, 59–75. 
18   HOWARD, supra note 10, at 140–99. 
19  Fred Gray described John Patterson as “very racist.”  GRAY, supra note 4, at 135. On the other hand, 
fellow activist Virginia Durr, who happened to be John Patterson’s cousin, seemed to forgive him for his 
segregationist actions. VIRGINIA DURR, OUTSIDE THE MAGIC CIRCLE 300–01 (1985). 
20  See discussions infra at Section III. The “freedom rides” took place in 1961 after the perjury prosecution 
that serves as the focus of this article. See RAYMOND ARSENAULT, FREEDOM RIDERS: 1961 AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (2006); J. MILLS THORNTON III, DIVIDING LINES: MUNICIPAL POLITICS AND 
THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN MONTGOMERY, BIRMINGHAM, AND SELMA 118–27 (2002). In 1961, an 
integrated group of civil rights activists (called the “Freedom Riders”) rode interstate buses into 
southern states that were violating federal law by forcing segregation on public buses. HOWARD, supra 
note 10, at 188. Klan members repeatedly and severely attacked the Freedom Riders along the way, 
often without any police intervention. THORNTON, supra note 20, at 118–19. After significant federal 
pressure, Patterson personally assured Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General, that he would protect the 
freedom riders, and then went back on his word, leaving them subject to attacks by a white mob in 
Montgomery. ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, TO REDEEM THE SOUL OF AMERICA: THE SOUTHERN LEADERSHIP 
CHRISTIAN CONFERENCE & MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 79 (2d ed. 2001). In a press conference, Governor 
Patterson referred to the Freedom Riders as “agitators” who came to Alabama “to force themselves into 
situations which tend to inflame the local people,” and to “incense them and enrage them and provoke 
them into acts of violence.” WSB-TV newsfilm clip of a press conference during which Alabama governor 
John Matterson condemns the Freedom riders for instigating racial trouble and demands that the 
Freedom Riders and Martin Luther King, Jr. leave the state, Montgomery, Alabama, 1961 May 23, CIVIL 
RIGHTS DIGITAL LIBRARY, http://crdl.usg.edu/export/html/ugabma/wsbn/crdl_ugabma_wsbn_34963.html. 
Additionally, in 1960, Governor Patterson demanded the expulsion of thirty-five Black students from 
Alabama State College for participating in a sit-in in the courthouse cafeteria. After further protests on 
and off campus, the governor ordered firings or resignations of over twenty faculty members 
sympathetic to civil rights. THORNTON, supra note 20, at 113–15. See also infra note 276. 
21  MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR 
RACIAL EQUALITY 135–37 (2004); Grady, supra note 10, at 116. Using the courts to shut down the 
NAACP reinforced John Patterson’s inclination to rely on the legal system to accomplish his purposes. 
THORNTON, supra note 20, at 117, 615. 







the NAACP responsible for what he viewed as the two most serious threats to 
Alabama’s racial status quo in the early and mid-1950s—the Montgomery Bus 
Boycott and the effort to integrate the University of Alabama through a constitutional 
challenge on behalf of Autherine Lucy in 1953.22 Even though the NAACP was not 
actually responsible for either of those threats, Attorney General Patterson viewed 
the NAACP as the most dangerous civil rights organization in the state.23 He believed 
that shutting it down could go a long way toward stopping the Civil Rights Movement 
there. 
Attorney General Patterson turned to the law and the courts to bar the NAACP 
from operating in the state. Because the NAACP was an out-of-state entity, he 
ordered the organization to provide a great deal of information about its operation in 
order to determine whether it was eligible to operate in the state.24 Most importantly, 
he sought to obtain the NAACP’s membership lists.25 The NAACP refused to turn 
over those lists, since that would have resulted in disastrous consequences for its 
members.26 Additionally, as a result, membership rolls would have declined 
dramatically.27   
With the organization’s refusal to reveal its members, Attorney General 
Patterson secured an injunction preventing it from operating in the state.28 As a 
result, the state branch of the NAACP was forced to shut down and to spend a great 
                                                 
22  HOWARD, supra note 10, at 101. The effort to integrate the University of Alabama began in 1952, when 
Autherine Lucy and Pollie Myers, both Black women, applied to the university for graduate school. 
Grafton & Permaloff, supra note 16; see also Christopher Coleman, Laurence D. Nee & Leonard S. 
Rubinowitz, Social Movements and Social-Change Litigation: Synergy in the Montgomery Bus Protest, 
30 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 663, 721 n.154 (2005). 
23  THORNTON, supra note 20, at 91. The organizers of the bus boycott created the Montgomery 
Improvement Association (MIA) to carry out the boycott, rather than having the NAACP do so. At the 
same time, a number of NAACP leaders played important roles in the bus boycott, including E. D. 
Nixon, Rosa Parks, and her lawyer Fred Gray. See generally TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: 
AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1954–1963, VOLUME 1 131–207 (1988); FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 20, at 15–
18, 23–25, 53–54; DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE SOUTHERN 
CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 11–32, 57–89 (1986); THORNTON, supra note 20, at 20–140.  
24  Grady, supra note 10, at 130; see BRANCH, supra note 23, at 186–87; HOWARD, supra note 10, at 101. 
25  See BRANCH, supra note 23, at 186–87; HOWARD, supra note 10, at 101; Grady, supra note 10, at 116. 
26  Joseph Mark Bagley, School Desegregation, Law and Order, and Litigating Social Justice in Alabama, 
1954–1973 at 110 (Jan. 5, 2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ga. State Univ.), 
http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/history_diss/37; see also GILBERT JONAS, FREEDOM’S SWORD: THE NAACP 
AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST RACISM IN AMERICA, 1909–1969, at 162–64 (2005) (discussing the frequency 
with which NAACP leaders and other Black activists lost their jobs, livelihoods, or were violently 
attacked and even killed as a result of their activism). 
27  See PATRICIA SULLIVAN, LIFT EVERY VOICE: THE NAACP AND THE MAKING OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 
425 (2009) (stating that membership fell from 8,266 to 2,202 in South Carolina when members’ 
identities were being made public). The NAACP’s Alabama membership decreased by 16,000 in 1957, 
representing more than half of the total national loss of 30,000. Grady, supra note 10, at 142. 
28  BRANCH, supra note 23, at 186–87; HOWARD, supra note 10, at 102; Grady, supra note 10, at 138. 
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deal of time and money litigating the matter up to the US Supreme Court.29 In 1958, 
the Supreme Court held the disclosure order invalid because it would deter 
membership due to physical and economic reprisals and because the identity of the 
members had nothing to do with the state’s interest in deciding whether the 
organization was required to register.30 After that, Governor Patterson returned to 
the receptive state courts repeatedly for procedural rulings that prolonged the ban on 
the NAACP.31 Finally, in 1964, the Supreme Court issued a direct order to Alabama 
authorities to permit the NAACP to do business in the state.32 In the meantime, John 
Patterson had prevented an important adversary from pursuing its objectives for 
more than eight years.33 However, the US Supreme Court’s repeated intervention 
proved frustrating to him and ultimately defeated his plan to exclude the NAACP 
permanently.34   
 
                                                 
29  BRANCH, supra note 23, at 186–87; Grady, supra note 10, at 145. Each of the four trips to the Supreme 
Court cost the NAACP around $18,000. HOWARD, supra note 10, at 103. 
30  See NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (Patterson I).  
31  See Jonathan L. Entin, ‘Destroying Everything Segregated I Could Find’: Fred Gray and Integration in 
Alabama, 7 CRITICAL REV. INT’L SOC. & POL. PHIL. 252, 260 (2004). 
32  NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 310 (1964). 
33  On June 30, 1958, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously that the right of association was guaranteed 
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and that the sort of beliefs advanced by a 
particular association, no matter how odious to some, were immaterial. The Court also ruled that 
privacy of an association’s membership may be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association. 
Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460, 462. Patterson originally filed a lawsuit seeking an injunction on NAACP 
activities in the state, which the segregationist circuit judge granted. When the NAACP appealed the 
injunction, Patterson asked the court to first order the production of NAACP records, including a 
member list. The NAACP refused to comply with the order and thus was held in contempt and unable 
to litigate the injunction. The NAACP appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which in 1958 reversed and 
remanded the contempt citation. The Alabama Supreme Court held the organization in contempt for a 
different reason and maintained the injunction. In 1959, the U.S. Supreme Court again reversed the 
contempt order and ordered the state to hear the case, and the state court simply did not do so. Next, 
NAACP attorneys sued in federal court seeking an injunction against the next Governor of Alabama. 
The Court again ordered the Alabama Supreme Court to hear the case, which they did, and found in 
favor of the state. When the NAACP appealed that ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court held the state court 
judgment unconstitutional and ordered the state to finally lift the ban on NAACP operations in the 
state. See generally Bagley, supra note 26, at 104–12; Patterson I, 357 U.S. at 452–55; NAACP v. Ala. ex 
rel. Patterson 360 U.S. 240, 240 (1959) (Patterson II); see NAACP v. Gallion, 368 U.S. 16, 16 (1961); 
Flowers, 377 U.S. at 288, 310. 
34  BRANCH, supra note 23, at 187; THORNTON, supra note 20, at 108. This was part of an effort by states 
across the South to shut down the NAACP branches. Months earlier, Louisiana attempted to remove 
the NAACP under an old state anti-Ku Klux Klan law that required such groups to file membership 
lists. HOWARD, supra note 10, at 100. Alabama’s attempt was later copied in Texas, Arkansas, Georgia, 
and Virginia. Id. at 103. 







B. The Prosecution    
1. The Perjury Indictment 
Having succeeded as attorney general in shutting down the NAACP, John 
Patterson continued his campaign against the Civil Rights Movement as governor.35 
In his inauguration speech, Governor Patterson expressed a total commitment to 
protecting the state’s segregation regime: 
 
There can be no compromise in this fight. There is no such thing as a 
“little integration.” The determined and ruthless purpose of the race 
agitators and such organizations as the NAACP is to bring about as fast 
as possible an amalgamation of our society. They seek to destroy our 
culture, our heritage, and our traditions. If we compromise or surrender 
our rights in this fight, they will be gone forever, never to be regained or 
restored.36 
 
Martin Luther King, Jr. was the leading “racial agitator” in the state and an 
obvious target for the governor, once the governor shifted his focus from organizations 
to individuals. Soon, an opportunity presented itself to Governor Patterson to 
continue his campaign of using the courts to undermine the Civil Rights Movement 
by prosecuting Dr. King.37 He viewed Dr. King as engaged in morally reprehensible 
actions that were especially pernicious because they were designed to undermine the 
“southern way of life.”38 Since he could not prosecute Dr. King for “crimes” against 
                                                 
35  In the governor’s race, John Patterson—unlike his young competitor George Wallace—understood 
clearly that success in the Democratic primary required an explicit and aggressive commitment to 
preserving and protecting racial segregation. See generally HOWARD, supra note 10, at 110–23, 140–49. 
After that defeat, Wallace determined that no one would ever out-race bait him again. In the next 
gubernatorial election, he promised “segregation now .  .  .  segregation tomorrow .  .  . segregation 
forever,” and won the election. DAN T. CARTER, THE POLITICS OF RAGE: GEORGE WALLACE, THE ORIGINS OF 
THE NEW CONSERVATISM, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 109 (1995). Though Patterson 
may have campaigned as an ardent segregationist in order to win the election, once he was elected 
Governor, he was likely acting out of conviction rather than opportunism. In 1958, it was highly 
unlikely Patterson had any hopes of achieving a higher office, or any political future immediately after 
his term as governor. He could not immediately run for a second term as governor, and both Alabama 
Senators seemed firmly entrenched in their positions. See E-mail from Jonathan L. Entin, Assoc. Dean 
for Acad. Affairs, David L. Brennan Professor of Law & Professor of Political Sci., Case W. Reserve 
Univ. Sch. of Law, to author (Dec. 20, 2016, 01:41 EST) (on file with author). 
36  JOHN PATTERSON, INAUGURAL ADDRESS OF JOHN PATTERSON GOVERNOR STATE OF ALABAMA (Jan. 19, 
1959), in 20 ALA. LAW. 129, 131 (1959). While his address referred specifically to integration of schools, 
his campaign sought to maintain all aspects of racial segregation. 
37  HOWARD, supra note 10, at 174. 
38  See id.; see also supra note 36 discussion. See generally Wilma Dykeman, What is the Southern Way of 
Life?, 44 SW. REV. 163 (1959). 
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southern culture, Governor Patterson pursued a prosecution based on the alleged 
underpayment of state income taxes to get him off the streets.39   
Each step Governor Patterson took related to the prosecution demonstrated 
his deep determination to eliminate Dr. King as an activist and to impose maximum 
financial and other costs on him, his followers, and his organization.40 The alleged 
evasion of state income taxes was a minor matter that would not have gotten a 
governor’s attention if it was only an instance of routine law enforcement. However, 
an effort to eliminate the man that the governor considered the state’s most 
dangerous civil rights leader was a logical follow-up to shutting down the NAACP.41  
The prosecution of Martin Luther King had strategic advantages for John 
Patterson over his effort to exclude the NAACP. While the latter proved to be 
vulnerable to constitutional challenges resolved by the US Supreme Court, a criminal 
prosecution under the state’s penal code started in the receptive state courts and was 
very likely to remain there. On its surface, it was a garden variety prosecution under 
the state’s traditional police power, with no obvious constitutional challenge that the 
Supreme Court was likely to hear.42 The defense made a number of constitutional 
objections, which went to the heart of the state’s Jim Crow legal system. But the trial 
judge promptly rejected them, as counsel expected. Several of the objections were as 
follows: exclusion of Blacks from the popular election of judges; exclusion of Blacks 
from juries (grand jury, petit jury panels, actual trial jury); and a due process 
challenge to the judge’s refusal to transfer the trial from Montgomery, where Dr. King 
arguably could not receive a fair trial because of its prejudiced jurors.43 Since Dr. 
                                                 
39  Fred Gray characterized the perjury prosecution as: “white authorities in Alabama made one last 
desperate attempt to use the courts and legal machinery to derail the civil rights movement and to 
smear its leader.”  He saw it as part of a plan that included Attorney General Patterson raiding the 
Tuskegee Civic Association and seizing its records and shutting down the NAACP. GRAY, supra note 4, 
at 146.  
40  See discussion infra Part II.  
41  Patterson had also made earlier efforts, possibly including a role in the Montgomery Bus Boycott. See 
BRANCH, supra note 23, at 277 (referring to Patterson having led the fight against the bus boycott). 
However, Patterson is not generally credited for this effort, see, e.g., THORNTON, supra note 20, at 82–83 
(discussing the boycott prosecution as having been called for by prominent local attorneys). Following 
Montgomery, Patterson did seek an injunction, based on the same act, to end a boycott against 
Tuskegee merchants by the Black Tuskegee Civic Association, but in that case the judge denied it due 
to a lack of connection between the association and any coercive or violent acts. Id. at 89–90. In 
discussing Governor Patterson’s role in initiating the perjury prosecution, Dyer said that Patterson 
“had established a pattern of pestering civil rights organizations as Alabama’s attorney general and 
was simply continuing this activity in the King indictment, purely for the purpose of harassment and 
humiliation.” See Dyer, supra note 2, at 248 (emphasis added). The indictment was far more insidious 
and ambitious than merely “pestering” the movement. Instead, it represented a key strategic move 
aimed at defeating the Civil Rights Movement in the state.  
42  See discussion infra Part IV.A. of the constitutional challenges that the defense raised, which had little 
chance of success at the Supreme Court. 
43  GRAY, supra note 4, at 154–57. 







King was acquitted, there was no appellate review of those claims; but success seemed 
far less likely than in the NAACP case.44  
The impetus for Governor Patterson seeking the perjury indictments seems to 
have been the 1959 publication of Uriah Fields’s book called The Montgomery Story: 
The Unhappy Effects of the Montgomery Bus Boycott.45 Fields was a local Black 
minister and former official of the Montgomery Improvement Association (MIA), the 
organization that carried out the bus boycott.46 He had become disaffected with the 
organization. 47  
During the boycott, Fields had publicly accused unnamed MIA leaders of 
misappropriation of funds.48 After Fields experienced a storm of protests and threats, 
he had a meeting with Martin Luther King, Jr. during which Fields appeared to 
recant. He did so again at a mass meeting.49 Dr. King encouraged his followers to 
forgive Fields.50    
However, in his short 1959 book, Fields renewed his claims of financial 
misconduct by MIA leaders.51 In recasting the boycott as “The Montgomery 
Catastrophe,” he once again accused boycott “leaders” and “bosses” of 
misappropriation of funds.52 He asserted that they had enriched themselves at the 
expense of the thousands of their fellow Blacks who they were supposed to be 
helping.53 He also said that $100,000 in MIA funds had disappeared and could not be 
accounted for.54 
                                                 
44  See discussion infra Part IV.A. of the likelihood of success on appeal if Dr. King had been convicted). 
45  See THORNTON, supra note 20, at 103; Reverend Martin Luther King Accused of Embezzlement by 
Minister He Defeated, PHILA. TRIB., Feb. 20, 1960, at 1 [hereinafter Phila. Trib.] (making the book’s 
existence and availability known to the public); see also THORNTON, supra note 20, at 612 n.133. See 
generally URIAH J. FIELDS, THE MONTGOMERY STORY: THE UNHAPPY EFFECTS OF THE MONTGOMERY BUS 
BOYCOTT (1959). 
46  See generally FIELDS, supra note 45; THORNTON, supra note 20, at 100.  
47  In a statement to the press, Fields stated that the MIA no longer represented what he stood for, and he 
accused the leaders of misusing funds as well as becoming focused on themselves instead of the goals of 
the movement. See MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., STRIDE TOWARD FREEDOM: THE MONTGOMERY STORY 153 
(1958); THORNTON, supra note 20, at 100. 
48  FIELDS, supra note 45, at 40; KING, supra note 47, at 153; See Steven M. Millner, The Montgomery Bus 
Boycott: A Case Study in the Emergence and Career of a Social Movement, in THE WALKING CITY: THE 
MONTGOMERY BUS BOYCOTT, 1955–1956, at 535 (David J. Garrow ed., 1989). A biographer of Dr. King 
referred to these as “reckless charges.” See ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT 121 (1991) [hereinafter MAKE NO LAW]. 
49  In his 2002 book, Fields said that he recanted in order to avoid interfering with the bus boycott, but he 
continued to believe that there was misappropriation of MIA funds. See URIAH J. FIELDS, INSIDE THE 
MONTGOMERY BUS BOYCOTT: MY PERSONAL STORY 140–44 (2002).  
50  Dyer, supra note 2, at 247–48; See BRANCH, supra note 23, at 189; FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 20, at 28. 
Later, Fields argued that he never recanted. Millner, supra note 48, at 536. 
51  See generally FIELDS, supra note 45. He had the book published by a vanity press. THORNTON, supra 
note 20, at 103.  
52  FIELDS (1959), supra note 45, at 36.  
53  Id. at 30, 35–36. 
54  Id. at 36–37.  
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Fields provided Governor Patterson an opportunity to try to eliminate the 
state’s leading civil rights activist, and the governor eagerly seized it. Governor 
Patterson took Fields’s accusations of misappropriation of funds very seriously. As a 
local Black minister and a former MIA official, Fields had access to inside 
information.55 His resignation from the MIA, ostensibly because of the problems he 
said that he identified, gave him added credibility.56 
However, many aspects of Fields’s book would have given an objective reader 
a great deal of pause about the credibility of the author’s account and its utility in 
pursuing a criminal charge against Dr. King.57 First, Fields acknowledged his deep 
disappointment that his colleagues did not choose him to lead the Montgomery 
Improvement Association, instead giving that honor to the newcomer, Martin Luther 
King, Jr.58 He claimed further that his many followers were on the verge of rebellion 
with that decision.59 Instead, the organizers elected him to the much lesser position 
of recording secretary.60 He even lost that post when he was not reelected in mid-
1956.61 At that point, he resigned from the organization, apparently out of anger and 
bitterness.62 That sequence of events suggests that the book may have just been 
Fields’s way of exacting revenge against the MIA leaders who he felt had disrespected 
and belittled him.63 
                                                 
55  See THORNTON, supra note 20, at 100. 
56  He also associated himself and his views with those of E.D. Nixon, a long-time leader of the Black 
community and a founder of MIA, who had also resigned from his position with the organization. See 
FIELDS (1959), supra note 45, at 29–31. 
57  See FIELDS (2002), supra note 49 at 136, 140; see also KING, supra note 47, at 134. Fields published a 
book in 2002, in which he admits that he was not in a position to write objectively about the 
Montgomery Bus Boycott and the MIA when he published his 1959 book: “About a year after King’s 
book, ‘Stride Toward Freedom,’ was published my book, ‘The Montgomery Story: The Unhappy Effects 
of the Montgomery Bus Boycott’ was published. But because I had been so greatly disenchanted with 
some bus boycott leaders, displeased with how I had been treated by them, painfully wounded and 
vengeance-ridden, admittedly, I was in no condition to write objectively and compassionately about the 
Montgomery Bus Boycott. . . . because I was bitter.” FIELDS (2002), supra note 49, at 14.  
58  See BRANCH, supra note 23, at 189; FIELDS (1959), supra note 45, at 24.  
59  Fields wrote: “I, who served as the original secretary of the Montgomery Improvement Association, 
narrowly missed being elected president. It is known that when many people heard that King instead 
of Fields had been elected president, they were moved to indignation.” Fɪᴇʟᴅs (1959), supra note 45, at 
24; see also Steven M. Millner, supra note 48, at 381, 534; PHILA. TRIB., supra note 45, at 1. 
60  FIELDS (1959), supra note 45, at 24–25. 
61  THORNTON, supra note 20, at 100.  
62  There is a controversy regarding the reason for Fields’ resignation. According to some sources, Fields 
was very upset that the MIA’s executive board did not reelect him to his position as recording secretary, 
which prompted his resignation and disaffection with the MIA. See KING, supra note 47, at 133; 
THORNTON, supra note 20, at 100; Dyer, supra note 2, at 247; see also STEWART BURNS, DAYBREAK OF 
FREEDOM: THE MONTGOMERY BUS BOYCOTT 274 (1997). However, Fields claims that he resigned because 
of the organization’s leadership’s so-called greed and misuse of funds. See FIELDS (1959), supra note 45, 
at 40. It is also possible that part of Fields’ resentment was due to jealousy of other MIA members who 
received honorariums for their speaking, while Fields was rarely ever asked to represent the MIA. See 
BURNS, supra note 62, at 275. 
63  In his 2002 book, Fields provided quite a different account of the bus boycott, acknowledging that his 
original version was a result of the personal hurt and pain resulting from the chain of events during the 







Moreover, Fields’s inflammatory rhetoric and highly critical tone about the 
boycott itself contrasted sharply with the views of the thousands of participants, civil 
rights activists elsewhere inspired by it, and historians’ assessments of the 
movement. Fields referred to the boycott as “The Montgomery Catastrophe” and 
claimed that:  
 
[T]he much publicized Montgomery boycott did not significantly contribute to 
the betterment of Montgomery, and the effect of that damnable catastrophe 
will cast its dismal shadow upon Montgomery for years to come, resulting, 
inevitably, in the retardation of progress in race relations and causing yet 
unborn generations to rise up and curse their elders of this very day.64 
 
Having made those bold assertions, Fields provided few specifics about 
financial wrongdoing and virtually no evidence in support of his vague claims.65 His 
only example was a charge that “$100,000” of MIA money had disappeared; but no 
details or evidence followed.66 Finally, Fields did not mention Martin Luther King, 
Jr. by name in his allegations. He referred only to unnamed “leaders” and “bosses.”67 
In short, Fields’s book inadvertently provided many reasons to view him as just a 
disgruntled participant who had not gotten the respect that he felt that he deserved 
and was simply making vague, unsubstantiated claims as a way of venting his 
frustrations and seeking revenge.68  
                                                 
boycott. His web site also acknowledged the problems with his earlier account. FIELDS (2002), supra 
note 49, at 162.  Years later in his personal website and 2002 book, Fields contradicted his earlier view 
of the boycott by calling it a success. Uriah Fields, Fifty Years After the Montgomery Bus Boycott, 
http://www.uriahfields.com/gpage2.html (last visited March 16, 2017). 
64  FIELDS, supra note 45, at 53. 
65  On numerous occasions Fields used general terms such as “according to reports,” “it is known,” etc. 
FIELDS, supra note 45, at 24, 33, 35–36, 42, 52, 66–68. 
66  See FIELDS, supra note 45, at 36, 52. 
67  Furthermore, in his 2002 book, Fields stated that he was more concerned about the credibility of other 
MIA leaders, rather than Dr. King, and mentioned that after his public allegations he told Dr. King 
that he did not think that Dr. King personally misused any MIA funds. See FIELDS, supra note 49, at 
30–34, 36, 51–52, 76, 85. In his 2002 book about the boycott, Fields talked more specifically about his 
1956 private meeting with Dr. King. He said that he told Dr. King that he did not believe that Dr. King 
had engaged in financial misconduct, that he was referring to other MIA leaders: “Then I told him 
remorsefully that I had no intention of hurting the Montgomery Bus Boycott and attempted to convince 
him that I did not feel that he had personally misused any MIA funds. I added that I felt some other 
leaders had misused MIA funds.” FIELDS, supra note 49, at 140; see KING, supra note 47, at 134. If 
Fields had said that in the 1959 book, perhaps there would not have been any perjury prosecution. 
68  E.D. Nixon, a long-time Montgomery civil rights activist and a founder of the Montgomery 
Improvement Association, also experienced frustrations and resigned from his official position as 
treasurer. He shared some of Fields’s concerns about inefficient management but did not agree with 
Fields’s claims that that there had been financial misconduct. In a July 27, 1977, interview with Steven 
M. Millner, Nixon said that the MIA had a lot of money at that time and they handled some of it 
unwisely. He stressed however that there was no stealing, just unwise handling. When he was asked 
about Fields’s allegations regarding Black ministers pocketing money, he confirmed that ministers 
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However, the dubiousness of Fields’s claims did not deter Governor Patterson 
from proceeding aggressively to pursue criminal charges against Dr. King.69 Governor 
Patterson followed up by seeking to gain access to Dr. King’s Atlanta bank records. 
He knew that he had no legal authority to see those private records, but he instructed 
an Alabama Revenue Department investigator to go to Dr. King’s Black-owned bank 
and “bluff his way into getting King’s financial records.”70 The deception worked just 
as intended. The bank officials were intimidated and confused by the auditor’s 
credentials, so they allowed him to see all of Dr. King’s bank records without a court 
order or any official authorization.71 This release of confidential information 
presumably violated Georgia privacy laws.72 Apparently, the size of Dr. King’s 
Atlanta bank account raised additional suspicion for the governor about possible 
under-reporting of his Alabama income for tax purposes.73 
Governor Patterson concluded that Dr. King had underpaid his Alabama 
income taxes in 1956 and 1958 and should be prosecuted for those offenses. William 
Thetford, the county solicitor (the local prosecutor), said later that he strongly 
disagreed with the governor about that course of action.74 Dr. King had just resigned 
as pastor at Montgomery’s Dexter Avenue Church and moved back to Atlanta.75 
                                                 
would frequently make a speech and take the money they received for themselves. E.D. Nixon 
elaborated on the reasons for his resignation from his position as a treasurer, explaining that he 
disagreed with how records were kept and that he wanted to protect his “open book” reputation. 
However, E.D. Nixon also seemed bitter because of the way he was treated by Dr. King, confirming that 
he felt like a forgotten man when he received no acknowledgment from Dr. King for helping him to 
become the head of the MIA. Millner, supra note 59, at 549–51. 
69  It would not be difficult to secure an indictment from the grand jury, since the bar was so low, and Dr. 
King was perceived as such a troublemaker by many whites. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 10, 142 (3d ed. 2002) (explaining that in a grand jury proceeding there is no 
judge, no right to counsel, the rules of evidence do not apply, and that, in most states, there is a 
probable cause standard, which means there only needs to be a reasonable belief the offense has been 
committed). Moreover, since the book helped trigger the investigation, the prosecutor called Fields as a 
witness before the grand jury that indicted Dr. King. See THORNTON, supra note 20, at 103; Dyer, supra 
note 2, at 247. 
70  See HOWARD, supra note 10, at 174.  
71  The bank called Dr. King to warn him about what was afoot and he quickly filed an amended state tax 
return and made proper payment. Governor Patterson still wanted to prosecute. See HOWARD, supra 
note 10, at 174–75; Dyer, supra note 2, at 262. 
72  In a 2002 interview, Governor Patterson said “they were all amazed that the Georgia bank allowed an 
Alabama official to see all of King’s bank records without a court order or any official authorization.” 
Dyer, supra note 2, at 262. 
73  “When he (Patterson) concluded that Dr. King’s income didn’t match his lifestyle, Patterson said he saw 
an opportunity to ‘unhorse King’ by getting a conviction that would send him to prison.” HOWARD, supra 
note 10, at 174.  
74  Years later, Thetford told historian Mills Thornton about this disagreement and said that he was 
secretly pleased about the acquittal. While this may have been the case, his statements are also self-
serving. For any prosecutor, an acquittal is a negative mark on the record. In this case, there could 
have been a particular blemish since he was unable to secure a conviction in this high-profile 
prosecution—covered by the media extensively—of the most hated civil rights leader in the state, even 
with the usual all-white jury. See THORNTON, supra note 20, at 615; Dyer, supra note 2, at 248.  
75  THORNTON, supra note 20, at 113; see discussion infra Part III.B.   







Thetford said that he had urged the governor to “let this sleeping dog lie.”76 Normally, 
this kind of case would be a matter for the local prosecutor’s discretion. The case 
involved a minor matter of alleged state income tax underpayment with a relatively 
small amount of money at issue.77 Dr. King was not a wealthy man alleged to have 
cheated the state out of tens of thousands of dollars.78 
But Governor Patterson finally ordered Thetford to proceed with the 
prosecution, and he went ahead with it.79 Governor Patterson’s aggressive 
intervention at the charging stage showed that much more was at stake for him than 
enforcing state tax laws. As Governor, Patterson continued to position himself as 
leading the state’s battle against the Civil Rights Movement.80 A successful 
prosecution of the leader of the Civil Rights Movement in the state would have made 
a major splash early in his term in the statehouse.81 
The governor did not want to pass up a chance to remove the key civil rights 
leader from his position in the movement.82 All indications were that Dr. King would 
be convicted—whether he was guilty or not.83 That would be an effective way of both 
punishing Dr. King for his past civil rights activity and preventing him from 
continuing to threaten the system of white supremacy.84 
                                                 
76  See THORNTON, supra note 20, at 615. 
77  Prior to the indictment, an auditor claimed King underreported his income by $7,012 in 1956 and 
$20,173 in 1958. At that time, Dr. King gave the agent $1,600 for payment. Dyer, supra note 2, at 247. 
78  Id. 
79  See infra Part III and infra text accompanying n.227. It is unclear if Gov. Patterson actually had legal 
authority to order Thetford to prosecute or simply used his political clout to do so. 
80  THORNTON, supra note 20, at 108–09; Grady, supra note 10, at 263–83. This again shows that Patterson 
was likely a segregationist out of conviction, rather than simply a political opportunist.  
81  As he signed the extradition papers from Georgia, Governor Patterson “made a merrily sarcastic public 
statement” that “if you dance, you must pay the fiddler.”  BRANCH, supra note 23, at 277. Any concern 
Patterson had about making a splash would have likely related to giving him leverage with the 
legislature, rather than his future political ambitions. 
82  Governor Patterson may have viewed the case as a necessary escalation of the prosecution strategy 
after the anti-boycott conviction during the Montgomery bus boycott proved ineffective. See infra Part 
I.B.2. Perjury was a more serious offense, with potential punishment that could take Dr. King out of 
the movement for an extended period. 
83  There was no reason for the governor to think that Dr. King would be acquitted any more than there 
was for Dr. King himself to think that would happen. See infra Part II. Perhaps the governor counted 
on an all-white jury to ignore the presumption of innocence and the prosecutor’s burden of proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt and to convict, even if the defendant was innocent. 
84  This trial was not the first time Governor Patterson and Dr. King had squared off. Patterson had 
subpoenaed Dr. King to testify in the State’s 1956 case against the NAACP. See Patterson, John 
Malcolm (1921- ), MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR AND THE GLOBAL FREEDOM STRUGGLE, 
http://kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/enc_patterson_john_malcolm_1921(last 
visited Jul. 14, 2016). See also Letter from John Patterson to Martin Luther King, Jr. (Jul. 12, 1956), in 
THE PAPERS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. VOLUME III: BIRTH OF A NEW AGE, DECEMBER 1955-DECEMBER 
1956 at 319–20 (Clayborne Carson et al. eds., 1997). During his time as Attorney General, Patterson 
had also had personally written and argued a response against Dr. King’s appeal to the Alabama 
Supreme Court in M. L. King, Jr. v. Alabama. The case dealt with Dr. King’s alleged violation of the 
state’s anti-boycotting law during the Montgomery bus boycott. See John Patterson, Brief and 
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The case could have been a preemptive strike to prevent Dr. King from 
returning to Alabama to carry out additional civil rights campaigns there.85 A press 
release dated December 1, 1959, quoted Dr. King as saying that he intended to remain 
a presence in Montgomery after his move to Atlanta: “He has assured its [MIA’s] 
members that he will be in and out of Montgomery ‘almost as much as ever.’”86 
Governor Patterson may have felt that Dr. King still posed a threat to white 
supremacy in Alabama, especially since the release also noted that part of Dr. King’s 
motivation for the move was his goal of launching a region-wide voter registration 
campaign.87  
                                                 
Argument by Attorney General John Patterson in Response to Martin Luther King, Jr.’s Appeal to the 
Alabama Supreme Court, ALA. DEP’T OF ARCHIVES & HISTORY, 
http://digital.archives.alabama.gov/cdm/ref/collection/voices/id/1945; State of Alabama v. M. L. King, Jr. 
(1956 and 1960), MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR & THE GLOBAL FREEDOM STRUGGLE, 
http://kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/enc_state_of_alabama_v_m_l_king_jr_1
956_and_1960/ (last visited Jul. 14, 2016). For his part, Dr. King wrote a letter in May of 1959 to 
Patterson demanding that he take greater responsibility for equal administration of justice in the State 
of Alabama and particularly in Montgomery. Dr. King also forwarded a copy of this letter to the 
Attorney General of the United States. Letter from Martin Luther King, Jr. to John Malcom Patterson 
(May 28, 1956), https://swap.stanford.edu/20141218225542/http://mlk-
kpp01.stanford.edu/primarydocuments/Vol5/28May1959_ToJohnMalcolmPatterson.pdf. One of 
Patterson’s motivations may simply have been to achieve a personal victory over an old foe.  
85  With his statewide perspective as governor, Patterson may have been concerned about Dr. King 
carrying out future campaigns in the state even though he no longer lived there. Dr. King frequently 
made trips back and forth to Atlanta when he was living in Montgomery. Governor Patterson’s 
motivations in chasing Dr. King and bringing Dr. King back from Atlanta for trial may have reflected a 
mixture of personal antipathy, concern that he would continue as a threat in Alabama and throughout 
the South, and a desire to send a message and intimidate those who might take Dr. King’s place. If so, 
he was quite prescient. The Birmingham movement in 1963 and the Selma Voting Rights initiative in 
1965 were among the most important campaigns of Dr. King’s career. See generally THORNTON, supra 
note 20, at 141–99. The state of Alabama continued to serve as the site of his major victories. If 
Governor Patterson’s plan had succeeded, Dr. King might well have been serving time in prison during 
that period. 
86  Press Release, SCLC, Dr. King Leaves for Atlanta (Dec. 1, 1959), THE MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 
RESEARCH & EDUC. INST. https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/king-papers/documents/sclc-press-release-dr-
king-leaves-montgomery-atlanta. 
87  Dr. King said that the campaign would span the whole South.  
After prayerful consideration, I am convinced that the psychological moment 
has come when a concentrated drive against injustice can bring great tangible 
gains. We must not let the present strategic opportunity pass. Very soon our 
new program will be announced. Not only will it include a stepped-up 
campaign of voter registration, but a full-scale assault will be made upon 
discrimination and segregation in all forms. We must train our youth and adult 
leaders in the techniques of social change through non-violent resistance. We 
must employ new methods of struggle, involving the masses of our people. . . . 
Atlanta is perhaps the most strategic location for the headquarters of this 
expedition. We intend that it shall reach the far corners of every state of the 
South. I hate to leave Montgomery, but the people here realize that the call 
from the whole South is one that cannot be denied. 
Id. Dr. King’s promises about a region-wide voting rights campaign were aspirational and inspirational, 
rather than literal. There were no specific plans at that time, and organizing efforts to that point had 
produced very modest results. See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 20, at 43–51. Moreover, his talk of spending 







Even if Dr. King had planned to remain mostly in Atlanta, Governor Patterson 
still may have wanted to prosecute him. With Dr. King’s continuing leadership in the 
southern civil rights movement, his message could have been felt by the Alabama 
Black Community.88 As long as he remained admirable, powerful, and credible, he 
remained a threat to the system of segregation. So one plausible explanation for the 
governor’s desire to prosecute Dr. King may have been the feeling that he needed to 
discredit Dr. King entirely, in hopes of crushing the spirit of the movement.89 
2. The Structure of the Prosecution 
The design of the prosecution suggests an intention to maximize Dr. King’s 
potential punishment as well as the burden on him of the process itself.90 In light of 
Governor Patterson’s intense interest in removing Dr. King from the movement—and 
the prosecutor’s expressed reluctance to proceed with the case—it is likely that the 
governor made the decisions about the prosecution’s structure as well. 
                                                 
a great deal of time in Montgomery seemed quite unrealistic. He would have to spend much of his time 
in Atlanta to fulfill his duties as co-pastor of his father’s church and as President of SCLC. He would 
also travel to other parts of the South because of the regional reach of that organization. His 
fundraising and strategic efforts would take him North, including meetings with inner-circle members 
in New York, sessions in Washington, D.C., and elsewhere. See BRANCH, supra note 23, at 225 
(estimating King’s annual travel at that time at 200 events and 780,000 miles per year, discussing Dr. 
King’s need to help at his father’s church); FAIRCLOUGH, supra n. 20, at 51 (discussing SCLC work needs 
in Atlanta and the region); GARROW, supra note 23, at 123–24 (stressing the move was due to increasing 
demand for SCLC leadership in the region, as well as Atlanta). 
88  If Dr. King had succeeded in launching the voter registration campaign, much could have been lost 
from Patterson’s perspective: it could give Black voters the power to determine the winner of a close 
election—a catastrophic prospect for a governor who campaigned on a platform of segregation. A press 
release regarding Dr. King’s move to Atlanta also quoted a Black Montgomery church leader:  
  Rev. King will not truly be leaving us because part of him always will 
remain in Montgomery, and at the same time, part of us will go with him. 
We’ll always be together, everywhere. The history books may write it Rev. 
King was born in Atlanta, and then came to Montgomery, but we feel that 
he was born in Montgomery in the struggle here, and now he is moving to 
Atlanta for bigger responsibilities.  
Press Release, SCLC, supra note 86. 
89  This seemed to be the view the Committee to Defend Martin Luther King, Jr. took regarding Governor 
Patterson’s motivation:  
What is the purpose of this indictment? It seeks to harass Dr. King and to 
discredit him . . . . [T]his man holds the trust and confidence of the Negro 
people. Therefore, the dixiecrats have unleashed this evil and groundless 
attack on his honesty, hoping to remove him from the scene. 
Statement on the Indictment of Martin Luther King, Jr., Comm. To Def. Martin Luther King, Jr., THE 
KING CTR. (Mar. 3, 1960), http://www.thekingcenter.org/archive/document/statement-indictment-mlk. 
90  This was a substantial escalation beyond Dr. King’s trial for violating Alabama’s anti-boycott 
misdemeanor statute during the bus boycott. His conviction did not interrupt his activism. See infra 
Part II.B (discussing the boycott). 
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The charge related to underpayment of state income taxes.91 This was 
essentially a matter of tax evasion.92 Instead, the charge was perjury—the first time 
in the state’s history a defendant was so charged in such a case.93 That ratcheted up 
the offense from the misdemeanor charge of tax evasion to the felony charge of 
perjury, with a possible sentence of two to five years in prison for each count and a 
greater stigma associated with the conviction as well.94 The technical basis for 
charging the felony of perjury rather than the misdemeanor of tax evasion was the 
allegation that he had perjured himself in signing his tax returns for 1956 and 1958.95 
With Governor Patterson’s goal of removing Dr. King for as long as possible and 
undermining his leadership, the perjury charges provided a creative tactic for 
pursuing those objectives.96 With the stakes higher, the costs of the legal defense 
increased accordingly, thus potentially diverting additional funds from the 
movement’s campaigns for change.97 
The charges against Dr. King related to two different years—1956 and 1958.98 
Rather than charging him with two counts of perjury and proceeding with one trial, 
the prosecutor tried him on the allegations related to 1956 in the initial trial, with an 
expectation of proceeding with a second trial on the 1958 charges after an anticipated 
conviction in the first one.99  
The prosecutor did not explain why the state employed this potentially more 
expensive approach for both sides.100 One possibility is that the governor wanted to 
impose the greatest costs possible on Dr. King. Two trials would add to the already 
                                                 
91  BRANCH, supra note 23, at 277; Dyer, supra note 2, at 248. 
92  BRANCH, supra note 23, at 277; GRAY, supra note 4, at 147; Dyer, supra note 2, at 248. 
93  BRANCH, supra note 23, at 277; Dyer, supra note 2, at 248; John Coombes, King Cleared of Falsifying 
Income Tax, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, May 29, 1960, at 2A. 
94  GRAY, supra note 4, at 147; Dyer, supra note 2, at 248. “The penalty for income tax perjury in Alabama 
is two to five years in prison.” Margaret Shannon, Jury Acquits King in Perjury Trial, ATLANTA J. & 
CON’T., May 29, 1960, at 22. “He could have been imprisoned for five years had he been convicted.” 
Martin Luther King Lauds White Jury That Freed Him, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., May 30, 1960, at 6. The 
decision to charge a felony rather than the misdemeanor of tax evasion may have been influenced by 
the ineffectiveness of the conviction for a misdemeanor under the anti-boycott statute during the 
Montgomery bus boycott. Id.; see also infra Part III.B.  
95   BRANCH, supra note 23, at 277. 
96  See supra text accompanying notes 1–9. Another reason Governor Patterson may have gone after Dr. 
King for perjury was the idea that tax evasion could be a mistake, or skimming from the government, 
but perjury makes him out to be a liar who is involved in the movement for financial gain. The latter 
causes much more damage to Dr. King’s credibility and the credibility of the movement. 
97  See discussion infra Part I.B.3 and infra text accompanying n.105–10 (dissuing implications, e.g., New 
York Times advertisement and libel suits). In addition to funds, the prosecution forced Dr. King and his 
colleagues to divert time and energy from the movement, regardless of the outcome.   
98  HOWARD, supra note 10, at 174; Dyer, supra note 2, at 248.  
99  State Silent on 2nd Case Against King, ALA. J., May 30, 1960, at 1B. The original intention was to 
convict him on the first charge and then proceed with a second trial on the other charge. After the 
acquittal in the first case, the prosecutors decided not to try Dr. King on the second charges because the 
evidence was so similar to the evidence that seemed to persuade the jury to acquit in the first case. Id.  
100  Once again, this may have been Governor Patterson’s decision, since he ordered the prosecution in the 
first place. 







very high defense costs. That approach would also add to the stigma and prolong the 
public humiliation that was so damaging to Dr. King personally and professionally.101 
Still another possibility is that he wanted to make sure that prison sentences would 
run consecutively rather than concurrently, which could happen with conviction on 
two counts in one trial.102 
3. An Inadvertent Additional Opportunity to Challenge the Civil Rights 
Movement 
The perjury prosecution provided an unexpected additional opportunity for 
Governor Patterson to use the courts to pursue Dr. King. In the lead-up to the trial, 
supporters of Dr. King took out a full-page advertisement in the New York Times to 
raise money needed for his legal defense and other civil rights activities.103 The ad 
made general claims about pervasive segregation and discrimination in Alabama, 
without naming any responsible public officials.104 It also included the names of four 
Black Alabama ministers as supporting those claims.105 The ad had some factual 
errors in describing alleged incidents of racial discrimination.106 In response, several 
Montgomery public officials sued the New York Times and the four Black ministers 
for libel, each seeking $500,000 in damages.107 
                                                 
101  See discussion infra Part II.A.  
102  It is not clear why they would have feared that outcome from an Alabama state judge. 
103  The purpose of the ad was to raise money for Dr. King’s defense and for the student movement, with 
sit-in demonstrations spreading across the South. BRANCH, supra note 23, at 288–89; GARROW, supra 
note 23, at 131; GRAY, supra note 4, at 148; MAKE NO LAW, supra note 48. 
104  See Heed Their Rising Voices, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1960, at L25, reprinted in MAKE NO LAW, supra note 
48, at 2–3. The ad also asserted that the perjury prosecution was part of a strategy “to behead this 
affirmative movement, and thus to demoralize Negro Americans and weaken their will to struggle.” 
BRANCH, supra note 23, at 289.  
105  It turned out that the ministers did not know that their names would be used in the ad. BRANCH, supra 
note 23, at 289; GRAY, supra note 4, at 166; MAKE NO LAW, supra note 48, at 31–32. On April 8, 1960, 
Police Commissioner Sullivan wrote letters to the four Black ministers listed as supporters of the New 
York Times ad, demanding a full retraction. The ministers were completely surprised because they did 
not know of the existence of the ad, much less that their names appeared in it, until they received that 
letter. BRANCH, supra note 23, at 289. Almost no one in Alabama was even aware of the ad, as only 394 
copies of the newspaper were circulated in Alabama, with only 35 of those being in Montgomery. See 
N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 260 n.3 (1964).  
106  The ad had minor technical errors, including stating that student protestors sang “My Country ‘Tis of 
Thee,” when they actually sang “The Star-Spangled Banner,” and that police “ringed” the campus, 
instead they massed along one border. BRANCH, supra note 23, at 289. 
107  MAKE NO LAW, supra note 48, at 10, 12. Sullivan and the other plaintiffs joined the ministers to keep 
the case in state court, as doing so eliminated the federal court’s diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 13–14. 
The state court found that the defendants had libeled the plaintiffs, granted the remedies sought, and 
used civil forfeiture to enforce the decision. GRAY, supra note 4, at 1227; MAKE NO LAW, supra note 48, 
at 33. Several years later, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the state court, in the landmark libel 
decision of N.Y. Times v. Sullivan and remanded the case to the state court. It did not specifically 
require the return of the property, which had long been sold, nor the return of the cost of the property. 
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Governor Patterson filed his own libel suit related to the advertisement.108 
Unlike the others, he included Dr. King as a defendant, even though Dr. King was 
not involved in the advertisement.109 The governor also sought double the relief 
requested by the other plaintiffs.110 His libel suit was just one more sign of Governor 
Patterson’s great determination to remove Dr. King from the scene, as he had done 
with the state’s NAACP.111  
II. THE CHALLENGES FOR MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 
The case was overwhelmingly stressful for Martin Luther King, Jr. in both 
personal and practical ways. It was a time of public humiliation.112 Moreover, he 
believed that his conviction was inevitable, even though he was innocent.113 He 
                                                 
See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 292; GRAY, supra note 4, at 1228. The Court held that a libel suit by public 
officials required proof of actual malice, and that the evidence presented was constitutionally 
insufficient to support the judgment against the defendants. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80, 285–88.  
108  BRANCH, supra note 23, at 312; MAKE NO LAW, supra note 48, at 13. 
109  Again, neither were the other four ministers. BRANCH, supra note 23, at 312; MAKE NO LAW, supra note 
48, at 13.  
110  BRANCH, supra note 23, at 312; MAKE NO LAW, supra note 48, at 13. Once again, Governor Patterson 
seized on the opportunity to maximize the financial pressure, presumably in the hope of putting the 
movement out of business. Relatedly, the damages sought would have also had a severe impact on the 
press, both in terms of possibly bankrupting the New York Times, and in making it so expensive to 
cover the Civil Rights Movement that the story would go unreported, which itself would kill the 
movement. See MAKE NO LAW, supra note 48, at 34. Justice Black observed that the Times was facing 
11 libel suits for a total of $5.6 million and that CBS was facing 5 suits demanding $1.7 million. See 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 295 (Black, J., concurring). Ironically, in subsequent decades, Morris Dees and 
the Southern Poverty Law Center used other kinds of civil litigation to put white supremacist groups 
out of business. After a hate crime, instead of suing the perpetrators, Dees goes after the groups they 
are associated with “in a bid to ruin them financially.” If the group cannot pay the damages, Dees forces 
liquidation of their assets with the goal of shutting down the organization. Raju Chebium, Attorney 
Morris Dees Pioneer in Using “Damage Litigation” to Fight Hate Groups, CNN (Sept. 8, 2000), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20071223063535/http://archives.cnn.com/2000/LAW/09/08/morris.dees.profi
le/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2016). See generally MORRIS DEES, A LAWYER’S JOURNEY: THE MORRIS DEES 
STORY (2001). 
111  See supra Part I.A. While Dr. King served as the direct target, the prosecution could undermine the 
viability and effectiveness of SCLC, the organization for which he served as president. ALAN F. WESTIN 
& BARRY MAHONEY, THE TRIAL OF MARTIN LUTHER KING: THE LANDMARK BIRMINGHAM CASE AND ITS 
MEANING FOR AMERICA TODAY 171 (1974); BRANCH, supra note 23, at 312. 
112  See supra Part 1.B.2. 
113  Dr. King was certain that he was innocent. He was quoted as saying “I knew it wasn’t true, but who 
would believe me?” Dyer, supra note 2, at 249. Further, the Alabama revenue agent had informed him, 
prior to the trial that he did not believe there was any evidence of fraud. Dyer, supra note 2, at 255; see 
infra text accompanying n.165. In fact, he had paid more than he believed he owed, under very strong 
protest, just to avoid an ongoing encounter with state tax officials, writing checks to both the IRS and 
the state of Alabama before moving to Atlanta. BRANCH, supra note 23, at 269; Dyer, supra note 2, at 
247. Dr. King’s check remained uncashed, apparently because tax officials had not reached a final 
decision on what he owed. MAKE NO LAW, supra note 48, at 122; LERONE BENNETT, WHAT MANNER OF 
MAN: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 116 (1992). Moreover, Dr. King’s close confidant, Stanley Levison, 
prepared his tax returns throughout his career. Levison was a successful business man as well as a 
lawyer, and Dr. King had complete confidence in him. “Throughout King’s career, Levison drafted 
articles and speeches for him, prepared King’s tax returns, and raised funds for SCLC.” Levison, 







anticipated that the consequences would be disastrous for his career, his personal 
life, and perhaps very damaging to the Civil Rights Movement as well.114 
As the prosecution became public, it caused him great embarrassment. It 
attacked a core aspect of his self-image and of his reputation—his honesty. 115 He 
acknowledged as much.116 His wife Coretta recalled that the case brought with it the 
greatest suffering of any event in her husband’s life up until that time:117 “[D]espite 
all of the bravery he had shown before, under personal abuse and character assaults 
. . . this attack on his personal honesty hurt him most.”118 Dr. King’s greatest fear 
was that his reputation for honesty would be destroyed with a conviction, replaced by 
the public image of a greedy liar who was out for himself.119 Fred Gray, a member of 
the defense team, characterized the prosecution as Dr. King’s “greatest challenge.”120  
On a practical level, Dr. King believed that conviction was a given. Several 
years later, Dr. King reflected on his mindset at the time of the prosecution: 
 
The case was tried before an all-white Southern jury. All of the 
State’s witnesses were white. The judge and the prosecutor were 
white. The courtroom was segregated. Passions were inflamed. 
Feelings ran high. The press and other communications media 
                                                 
Stanley David (1912-1979), MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR & THE GLOBAL FREEDOM STRUGGLE, 
http://kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/enc_levison_stanley_1912_1979/ (last 
visited July 4, 2016). 
114  GRAY, supra note 4, at 147–48. 
115  Dyer, supra note 2, at 248–49; In a February 22, 1960 letter to Goshen College where Dr. King was 
supposed to speak, Dr. King’s secretary noted his mental state in regards to the perjury trial: “As you 
probably know, the state of Alabama has attacked Dr. King on a charge of perjury regarding income 
tax. This has caused him quite a bit of strain because this is an attack on his integrity and honesty. Of 
course, we feel that it’s just another attempt to harass him and embarrass him.” Richard R. Aguirre, 
Martin Luther King Jr.’s Visit to Goshen College in 1960 Inspired the Entire Campus, GOSHEN C., 
https://www.goshen.edu/ciie/intercultural/goshen-visit/ (last visited July 14, 2016). 
116  “He noted that he had been previously convicted in Alabama and had risked his life in bombings but 
the tax case hit him hardest because ‘I was being attacked on honesty.’” Martin Luther King Lauds 
White Jury That Freed Him, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., May 30, 1960, at 6.  
117  GARROW, supra note 23, at 130; see also CORETTA SCOTT KING, MY LIFE WITH MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 
185 (1969); 5 THE PAPERS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.: THRESHOLD OF A NEW DECADE, JANUARY 1959-
DECEMBER 1960 at 28 (Clayborne Carson et al. eds., 2005).  
118  See CORETTA SCOTT KING, supra note 117, at 185. Another possible explanation may be that his spirit 
was just broken by this time. Since Dr. King began doing Civil Rights work, he had “been arrested five 
times on trumped up charges. His home ha[d] been bombed. His life ha[d] been threatened countless 
times.” Statement on the Indictment of Martin Luther King, Jr., supra note 89.  
119  BRANCH, supra note 23, at 277. Clarence Jones, a member of the defense team who would become a 
member of King’s inner circle, initially assumed that Dr. King was just “some Negro preacher [who] got 
his hand caught in the cookie jar stealing . . . .” CLARENCE B. JONES & STUART CONNELLY, BEHIND THE 
DREAM: THE MAKING OF THE SPEECH THAT TRANSFORMED A NATION 37 (2011). 
120  GRAY, supra note 4, at 147–48. 
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were hostile. Defeat seemed certain and we in the freedom 
struggle braced ourselves for the inevitable.”121  
 
Dr. King had little trust in southern state courts to provide justice for Black 
people who came before them.122 He viewed the judges and jurors as politically and 
personally committed to maintaining white supremacy, including the segregation 
that permeated social life in the South.123 He viewed the courts as an integral part of 
the system of Jim Crow segregation, so his innocence of the charges would not protect 
him. 
Dr. King’s distrust of the legal system grew out of his own experience as well 
as his awareness of a long history of racism in southern states’ courts. During the 
Montgomery bus boycott, Dr. King and eighty-eight other leaders had been indicted 
for allegedly violating the state’s ancient anti-boycott statute.124 He alone was tried 
and convicted.125 The Alabama Supreme Court had previously ruled that liability 
under the state statute required the use of violence.126 The prosecution’s case focused 
in significant part on allegations that Blacks stayed off the buses because of physical 
intimidation by the Montgomery Improvement Association under Martin Luther 
King’s leadership.127 However, the prosecution introduced no evidence linking Dr. 
King, a strong advocate of non-violence, to any of the alleged threats or violence.128 
Nevertheless, as expected, the jury convicted Dr. King of violating the anti-boycott 
                                                 
121  KUNTSLER, supra note 4, at xxiv. On the central question of whether Dr. King’s income exceeded what 
he had reported, the lawyers shared their client’s view that the jury would agree with the prosecutor. 
They expected that their client would spend the decade in prison, and they told him as much. BRANCH, 
supra note 23, at 293. Even Dr. King’s lawyers were skeptical about his claims and worried that he had 
actually underpaid his taxes. It was not until Chauncey Eskridge, a tax expert with training in 
accounting in William Ming’s Chicago firm, entered the scene that they began to believe in their client’s 
innocence. Eskridge discovered that Dr. King kept day-by-day pocket diaries of his receipts and 
expenditures. Since diaries could be admissible as evidence, Eskridge analyzed the ones for 1956 in 
great detail. He concluded that their client had paid the state what he owed and reported his findings 
to the legal team. Id. at 293–97. 
122  See MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., STRIDE TOWARD FREEDOM: THE MONTGOMERY STORY 131–32 (1958) (“The 
Negro goes into these courts knowing that the cards are stacked against him. Here he is virtually 
certain to face a prejudiced jury or a biased judge, and is openly robbed, with little hope of redress.”); 
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN’T WAIT 29 (1964) (describing that the threat of jailing a Black 
person meant “that his day in court, if he had it, would be a mockery of justice”). 
123  In a 1956 interview with a Black newspaper, Dr. King said, “Our local judges, it seems, succumb to 
whims and caprices of local custom in deciding cases like ours.” JACK BASS, TAMING THE STORM: THE 
LIFE AND TIMES OF JUDGE FRANK M. JOHNSON, JR., AND THE SOUTH’S FIGHT OVER CIVIL RIGHTS 109 (1993). 
124  Randall Kennedy, Martin Luther King’s Constitution: A Legal History of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, 
98 YALE L.J. 999, 1029 (1989); THORNTON, supra note 20, at 81, 84. 
125  Kennedy, supra note 124, at 1029, 1034; THORNTON, supra note 20, at 88–90. Dr. King had never won a 
trial in an Alabama court. BRANCH, supra note 23, at 308. 
126  Lash v. State, 244 Ala. 48, 56 (1943) (holding that the anti-boycott statute could only be constitutional 
as applied to boycotts enforced by violence or other unlawful activities); THORNTON, supra note 20, at 
89. 
127  Kennedy, supra note 124, at 1031–32.  
128  Id. at 1031–32, 1041; THORNTON, supra note 20, at 89. 







statute.129 Even the judge acknowledged Dr. King’s commitment to non-violence, and 
he took that into account in the sentencing process.130 That the conviction had no 
basis in evidence reinforced Dr. King’s perception that any prosecution of a Black 
defendant, especially a leader like him, would lead to a guilty verdict from an all-
white jury.131 
Dr. King viewed his unjust conviction in the 1956 boycott trial as just another 
example of “southern justice.”132 Whites routinely convicted Black defendants, 
regardless of the evidence or of their guilt or innocence. Perhaps the best known 
historical example was the infamous wrongful 1931 Alabama conviction of the nine 
“Scottsboro boys” for allegedly raping two young women on a train.133 The US 
Supreme Court overturned the conviction because of the obvious and extreme 
unfairness of the state court trial.134 
Coincidently, there was another example of racial injustice in the Alabama 
courts just a few weeks before Dr. King’s perjury trial. The Montgomery ordinance 
prohibiting whites and Blacks from eating together in restaurants had recently been 
repealed.135 A group of white college students on a field trip in Montgomery with their 
white professor was eating with some Black activists at a Black-owned restaurant 
when a police officer noticed them.136  Notwithstanding the legality of their 
interaction, numerous police cars arrived at the scene, which in turn attracted a 
                                                 
129  THORNTON, supra note 20, at 90; Kennedy, supra note 124, at 1034. 
130  The judge minimized the punishment because of that. THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, 
JR. 86 (Clayborne Carson ed., 1998) 
131  After reviewing the requirements for conviction under the law and the evidence the prosecution 
presented, leading historian Mills Thornton concluded that “There can simply be no question, therefore, 
that the state supreme court’s 1943 interpretation of the anti-boycott statute entitled King to an 
acquittal.” THORNTON, supra note 20, at 89. Professor Kennedy suggested that the conviction was 
“virtually certain” no matter how the defense presented its case. Kennedy, supra note 124, at 1035. 
132  See generally SOUTHERN JUSTICE (Leon Friedman ed., 1965). 
133  See generally JAMES R. ACKER, SCOTTSBORO AND ITS LEGACY: THE CASES THAT CHALLENGED AMERICAN 
LEGAL AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (2008). 
134  The Supreme Court actually overturned their convictions twice. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 
(1932) (holding that the defendants’ due process rights were denied based on the denial of effective 
counsel, where counsel was assigned immediately prior to the one day trials); Norris v. Alabama, 294 
U.S. 587 (1935) (holding that the systematic exclusion of Blacks from juries violated the equal 
protection clause). More recently, an Alabama trial judge gave an instruction to the all-white jury, in 
an early 1950s trial, that they could take the Black defendant’s race into account in deciding whether 
he was guilty of attempted rape of a white woman. While the judge did not explain that instruction, the 
implicit racist message was obvious. McQuirter v. State, 63 So.2d 388 (Ala. 1953). The racist 
stereotypes implicit in the instruction included: (1) Black men are sex-crazed and want to have sex with 
white women; and (2) all credibility questions should be resolved against Black defendants (especially 
men) and in favor of whites (a woman in this case). 
135  Clifford J. Durr, Sociology and the Law: A Field Trip to Montgomery, Alabama, in Friedman, supra 
note 132, 43, 46.  
136  Friedman, supra note 132, at 45–46. The police officer arrived after the department received an 
anonymous tip that some young, white women had been seen entering the restaurant with Blacks. Id. 
at 46. 
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crowd of onlookers on the street.137 Ultimately, the police arrested the whole group in 
the restaurant, charged them with disturbing the peace, and the local judge convicted 
them.138 If there was any disturbance of the peace, it was caused by the police. That 
incident presumably reinforced Dr. King’s belief that his conviction was inevitable.139  
Dr. King’s lawyers were so concerned about the racial tensions in Montgomery 
that they moved for a change of venue on the grounds that Dr. King could not get a 
fair trial in the city.140 Judge Eugene Carter’s denial of that motion probably added 
to Dr. King’s sense of the inevitability of his conviction. Also, the state’s striking of 
the only three Black people in the venire produced the usual all-white jury.141  
As certain as Dr. King was that he would be convicted, he was equally sure of 
his innocence. One reason for his confidence was that Lloyd Hale, an Alabama State 
revenue agent, told him as much:142 
 
The last time the state came and said that since I was leaving the state they 
wanted to make this audit. And the man who made the audit made it very clear 
to me, over and over again, that my returns were thoroughly honest and 
accurate as anyone could make return, but he also admitted that he was under 
pressure from his superiors to bring some charges.143  
 
Dr. King was all too aware of how little innocence mattered to Alabama prosecutions 
of Black defendants. So he had little expectation of justice prevailing. 
III. THE ACQUITTAL  
The acquittal is the central mystery of the case. After the three-day trial 
concluded, the judge gave the jurors instructions, and they retired to deliberate. 
Three hours and forty minutes later, they returned from the jury room, having 
acquitted Dr. King of perjury.144 A news report said that “King seemed stunned by 
                                                 
137  Id. at 49. 
138  Id. at 45. All the Blacks were tried together, separately from all of the whites. On May 9, 1960, all of 
the Blacks were convicted, along with only the white professor in charge of the group of whites. All of 
the convictions were later overturned on appeal, on narrow technical grounds relating to the language 
of the complaints. Id. at 51–54. Clifford Durr represented the white students and the professor, at the 
request of the college. SARAH HART BROWN, STANDING AGAINST DRAGONS: THREE SOUTHERN LAWYERS IN 
AN ERA OF FEAR 184 (1998). 
139  Dr. King surely knew of the incident. It occurred in Montgomery; word of mouth would have gotten it to 
him. It also made the local newspaper. Moreover, Fred Gray acted as one of the attorneys for the Blacks 
who were arrested. Id. at 12. 
140  Dyer, supra note 2, at 253; GRAY, supra note 4, at 151–52. 
141  Dyer, supra note 2, at 254; see also Part. IV.A. (discussion of jury-selection process).   
142  During an interview Dr. King gave on February 17, 1960, he stated that his tax returns had previously 
been investigated two or three times. Interview with Martin Luther King, Jr. Following Indictment by 
Grand Jury of Montgomery County (Feb. 17, 1960), in THE PAPERS, supra note 84, at 370–72. 
143  Id. 
144  Martin Luther King, Jr., Statement on Perjury Acquittal, in THE PAPERS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 
VOLUME V: THRESHOLD OF A NEW DECADE, JAN. 1959–DEC 1960, at 99, 462 (Univ. of Cal. Press at 
Berkeley & Los Angeles ed., 2005). 







the verdict . . . .”145 His co-lead counsel, Hubert Delaney, said that the acquittal was 
“the most surprising thing in my 34 years as a lawyer.”146 Fred Gray, also of Dr. 
King’s defense team, had a similar reaction:  
 
We were joyfully surprised when the jury foreman stood up and read the 
verdict: “Not guilty”. No one would have predicted that an all-white jury in 
Montgomery, Alabama, the Cradle of the Confederacy, in May, 1960, in the 
middle of all of the sit-ins and all of the racial tension that was going on, would 
exonerate Martin Luther King, Jr. But it really happened.147 
 
There is no definitive answer to the key question of why the jurors acquitted 
Dr. King. None of them spoke publicly at the time, and they have all since passed 
away.148 Nor is there necessarily any single explanation, since even individual jurors 
may have had mixed motives and the jury as a whole may have arrived at the 
surprising result for multiple reasons.  
In a sermon the day after the acquittal, Martin Luther King, Jr. described the 
verdict as a “quirk.”149 While he speculated about possible reasons for the jurors’ 
decision, he did not suggest that he could explain it.150 Instead, he simply concluded 
that “[s]omething happened to the jury.”151 
The following discussion considers two possibilities of what might have 
“happened to the jury.”152  The first one reflects traditional jury decision-making 
processes and emphasizes the weakness of the state’s case.153 The jurors acquitted 
Dr. King. Therefore, the jurors acquitted him because the state’s case was very weak. 
The argument is that the evidence carried the day with fair-minded jurors.154  
A potentially complementary explanation brings the larger political and social 
context into the jury room. It suggests that the jurors took account of the local 
circumstances in 1960—Dr. King having moved to Atlanta, hard-core segregationists 
in the ascendancy, and the Black community in relative disarray—and concluded that 
                                                 
145  Id.; see also Dyer, supra note 2, at 258. 
146  BRANCH, supra note 23, at 309. 
147  GRAY, supra note 4, 154. 
148  Jim McElhatton, For King, Acquittal Was a Triumph of Justice that Changed History, WASH. 
TIMES (Aug. 25, 2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/aug/25/author-reveals-new-
findings-from-martin-luther-kin/. 
149  Id.; BRANCH, supra note 23, at 310. 
150  BRANCH, supra note 23, at 311. 
151  Id. 
152  Each one includes a subsidiary explanation that is related to the broad one. Id. 
153  A number of participants and observers seem to subscribe to this line of reasoning, which has become 
the conventional explanation. Id. 
154  Fred Gray used the term “fair minded” in praise of exceptional judges. GRAY, supra note 4, at 386. 
Related to that is a possible concern among the jurors that conviction might expose them and other 
taxpayers to the risk of future tax audits and prosecution for underpayment of taxes. 
260      Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality           [5:2 
 
a conviction would be counterproductive to the interests of white Montgomery. Rather 
than risk making Martin Luther King into a martyr and rekindling the highly 
disruptive mass Black movement of the mid-1950s, they decided to “let this sleeping 
dog lie.”155 The jurors might have concluded that Montgomery’s white community 
would be better off with Martin Luther King, Jr. back in his new home in Atlanta 
rather than in an Alabama prison.156 The suggestion here is that each of these 
explanations was necessary, but neither was sufficient to produce an acquittal. 
A.  A Substantive Explanation: A Weak Case and Fair-minded Jurors   
This is seemingly the most obvious explanation for the acquittal.157 The state’s 
case was weak, and the defense team was strong. Dr. King’s initial reaction to the 
verdict credited the jurors for rising above their racial biases. Outside the courtroom, 
after the trial, he spoke to the press about his acquittal:  
  
This represents to my mind great hope, and it reveals that said on so many occasions, 
that there are hundreds and thousands of people, white people of goodwill in the South, 
and even though they may not agree with one’s views on the question of integration, 
they are honest people and people who will follow a just and righteous path.158   
                                                 
155  See infra Thetford’s use of the term p. 269. 
156  A related objective seems to have been a desire to project the city of Montgomery and the state of 
Alabama in a positive light to the outside world. The Statement on the Indictment of Martin Luther 
King, Jr. issued by the committee to Defend Martin Luther King, Jr, made it abundantly clear to any 
potential jurors that if the jury convicted Dr. King, this case would continue to be appealed to the 
highest court. The statement essentially threatened that this would cause Alabama to appear racist to 
the rest of the country (“When this case is brought out of the Alabama courts into the Federal court—
and to the Supreme Court, if necessary—the State of Alabama will be revealed as the real criminal. It 
will be exposed as a contemptuous evader of the law, as it has been again and again in voting cases, 
school desegregation, and the denial of due process to its Negro citizens for almost 100 years. More 
specifically, the Dixiecrats at this point are seeking to frustrate the drive of Negroes to register and 
vote and to achieve this they are determined to destroy Dr. King.”). Statement on the Indictment of 
Martin Luther King, Jr., supra note 89. 
157  The convergence theme suggested here is arguably more nuanced and persuasive than the “fair-minded 
jurors” approach, since it takes into account the political and social context in which the jurors decided. 
See infra pp. 268–74. 
158  Coretta Scott King also seemed to subscribe to the “fair minded jurors” explanation: “A southern jury of 
twelve white men had acquitted Martin. It was a triumph of justice, a miracle that restored your faith 
in human good.” KING, supra note 117, at 187. Dr. King also paid tribute to his lawyers at that time: 
“And I certainly want to commend all of the lawyers, this brilliant array of lawyers who represented me 
in this case. And I’m sure that their brilliant and profound arguments and that factual evidence played 
a great part in the ultimate decision, which was one of not guilty.” King, supra note 144, at 462.  
 
Several years later, Dr. King elaborated on his tribute to the lawyers.  
There were two men among us who persevered with the conviction that it was 
possible, in this context, to marshal facts and law and thus win vindication. 
These men were our lawyers, Negro lawyers—Negro lawyers from the North: 
William Ming of Chicago and Hubert Delaney from New York. They brought 
to the courtroom wisdom, courage, and a highly developed art of advocacy; but 
most important, they brought the lawyers’ indomitable determination to win. 
After a trial of three days, by the sheer strength of their legal arsenal, they 








Some of the defense counsel shared that view of the acquittal.159 Local and national 
media accounts subscribed to it as well.160 Finally, scholars seemed to accept the fair-
minded jurors hypothesis, also.161 All did so without much discussion or analysis.   
                                                 
overcame the most vicious Southern taboos festering in a virulent and flamed 
atmosphere and they persuaded an all-white jury to accept the word of a Negro 
over that of white men. 
 
Id. at xxiv. 
159  Like Dr. King, defense counsel Fred Gray found that the verdict helped to restore his faith in the 
judicial system in Alabama. GRAY, supra note 4, at 159. In his sermon the next day, Dr. King once 
again referred to that possibility, as well as the possibility that the jurors reacted as taxpayers to the 
concern that they, too, might be subjected to an unjustified prosecution. BRANCH, supra note 23, at 310–
11. A half century after the trial, Clarence Jones, another member of the defense team, tried to recall 
his sense at the time of the reason for the acquittal: 
 
So people have asked me, ‘Well how is it in April, 1960, Martin Luther King, 
Jr. can be acquitted by an all-white jury in Montgomery?’ and my explanation 
is, based upon my recollection . . . I won’t say the jury being polled, but 
information that came back to us – the tax attorneys had so destroyed the 
government’s, the State of Alabama’s case, just ripped it to shreds, that the 
jurors had to make a decision of whether or not they were going to look like 
idiots and buffoons by having convicted this man, or whether they should 
acquit him. And they had to live in that community. And I think they decided, 
rather than be ridiculed because the government looked like a fool, that’s why 
they voted for an acquittal.  
 
Clarence Jones, Martin Luther King’s Lawyers’ Symposium, 10 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y. 688, 694 (2016). 
160  In an article that was published in the Black-owned New Pittsburgh Courier on June 4, 1960, titled 
“Why Did Alabama Jury Free King?,” the author states that there are two reasons for the acquittal: (1) 
Brilliant defense lawyers; and (2) The jury felt the weight of the evidence in favor of Dr. King was too 
overwhelming to be overlooked. See Trezzvant W. Andersen, Why Did Alabama Jury Free King?, N. 
PITT. COURIER, June 4, 1960, at 2. In an obviously self-serving editorial, the Alabama Journal claimed 
that the “verdict in this case ought to go far to prove to the outside world Montgomery’s fairness and 
justice in dealing with Negro defendants.” It also said that “[King] evidently thought he could not have 
his income tax case handled fairly because of the low esteem in which he is held in Montgomery. 
Probably no living man is more detested in Montgomery than this self-serving blatant agitator who has 
done so much to disrupt the pleasant race relations Montgomery has long enjoyed.” That he was 
acquitted “testifies to the high quality of our jurors.” The Verdict in King Case, ALA. JOURNAL, May 31, 
1960, at 4-A. The Alabama Attorney General also used the acquittal as conclusive evidence that even 
the most hated man in Montgomery could get a fair trial in Alabama. Dyer, supra note 2, at 259. 
161  Professor Dyer shared this view of the jury: “The twelve men who comprised the jury obviously took 
their job very seriously and avoided a racially inspired discriminatory verdict.” Dyer, supra note 2, at 
260. Leading historian Mills Thornton suggested that, from the extreme segregationists’ perspective, 
“only the jurors’ excessive scruples” prevented Dr. King from spending years in prison. Thornton, supra 
note 20, at 118. In his biography of Dr. King, David L. Lewis noted the absurdity in prosecuting 
someone for underpayment of taxes when the state had not reached a final determination of what the 
taxpayer owed. He assumed that the jurors were moved by that fact: “Here was logic that spoke even to 
the hard prejudices of the white jurors.” MAKE NO LAW, supra note 48, at 122. Professor Entin also 
suggested that Dr. King’s acquittal by a white jury “graphically demonstrates the weakness of the case 
against him.” Entin, supra note 31, at 252–78. Other historians simply reported the verdict without 
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The “fair-minded juror” hypothesis emphasizes the weakness of the state’s case 
and Dr. King’s lawyers’ ability to undermine the state’s case and present their own 
persuasive evidence and arguments.162 The state’s case appeared to rest on a faulty 
premise. The auditor determined Dr. King’s taxable income simply by adding up the 
deposits to his bank account.163 Since he assumed that all of those deposits 
represented taxable income, he may have included nontaxable travel expenses for Dr. 
King’s many speaking engagements around the country, as well as nontaxable gifts 
that he had received.164  
The glaring weakness in the state’s case seemed to be that its main witness, 
the state’s revenue auditor, testified honestly that he did not find any evidence that 
Dr. King had committed fraud.165 In cross-examining Lloyd D. Hale, the state’s key 
witness, William Ming elicited evidence that strongly supported Dr. King’s case. 
First, Hale acknowledged that he was still not sure how much Dr. King had earned 
in 1956.166  Moreover, Hale acknowledged that he had told Dr. King in Atlanta that 
there was no evidence of fraud in his tax return.167 Dr. King had paid, under protest, 
                                                 
examining the reasons for the acquittal. BRANCH, supra note 23, at 309–11; BENNETT, supra note 113, 
at 116–67; GARROW, supra note 23, at 136–37. None of the historians considered the consequentialist 
possibility discussed here. 
162  Dyer, supra note 2, at 258. 
163  THORNTON, supra note 20, at 117. 
164  Id. Since there was no appeal, no trial transcript was made. The result is that the discussion of the 
evidence is based largely on Dyer’s discussion, using newspaper articles and interviews. At the request 
of the author, a tax attorney with thirty years of experience reviewed the material available and found 
it impossible to make an overall assessment of the evidence because so much information was missing. 
He raised concerns about both the prosecutor’s apparent theory that all remittances Dr. King received 
related to the movement constituted income to him and problems related to Dr. King’s record keeping 
that relied on a diary and his memory. The expert’s conclusion was that he had “insufficient 
information to evaluate the case.” Since there was no trial transcript available, it is uncertain whether 
the expert would have been able to carry out a full evaluation with the transcript and exhibits. 
Memorandum from Douglas H. Frazer, DeWitt Ross & Stevens Law Firm to Professor Len Rubinowitz 
(June 4, 2013) (on file with author). 
165  There was also evidence that the auditor had insisted that Dr. King had underreported his income. 
Dyer, supra note 2, at 247. Notwithstanding his strong disagreement with that assessment, Dr. King 
submitted a check under protest for about $1,600 and considered the matter closed. Id. Note that the 
discussion of the evidence relies heavily on Dyer, Gray, MLK biographies, and the sources cited there. 
The main focus is on the testimony of the state’s auditor, which seems to have been honest and 
straightforward and undermined the state’s claims. See BRANCH, supra note 23, at 294–99 (discussing 
Chauncey Eskridge’s examining Dr. King’s diaries as evidence). The defense submitted Dr. King’s 
secretary’s diary that provided the basis for listing expenses associated with speaking engagements. 
Dyer, supra note 2, at 256. 
166  BRANCH, supra note 23, at 308; LEWIS, supra note 103, at 122. 
167  BRANCH, supra note 23, at 308. Hale’s concession brought an audible gasp from the spectators, with a 
white Alabama official providing support for Dr. King’s claim, thus endangering the outcome of this 
political trial of a Black leader. Id. While the evidence was irrelevant to many white jurors in cases 
with Black defendants, that was especially the case when there were violent crimes alleged, where 
there were specific victims, especially white victims, and most especially white women alleged victims. 
See supra note 134 discussion. The alleged offense here was financial rather than violent and there was 
no individual victim. That suggests the possibility of a verdict based on the evidence, even with a Black 







the additional amount that the auditor said that he owed; but that did not prevent 
the prosecution.168  
Defense witnesses may have strengthened Dr. King’s position. One of those 
was Dr. King himself.169 In addition, the defense presented its own expert witness on 
the financial and tax-related accounting issues at the heart of the case, as well as 
character witnesses on behalf of Dr. King.170 The impact of this evidence on the jury 
remains unclear.171  
Finally, in his closing argument, defense counsel William Ming emphasized 
that the state’s key witness, the revenue agent, had testified that there was no 
evidence of fraud on Dr. King’s part.172 The state presented no evidence contradicting 
that statement. Ming then challenged the jurors to imagine the implications for them 
if the state determined their taxable income by their bank accounts.173 He argued 
that if tax officials could do that to anyone, all taxpayers were at risk of facing 
prosecution for underpayment of their state income tax.174  
                                                 
defendant. However, in the 1956 anti-boycott case, there were no specific victims and the jury convicted 
Dr. King without any evidence linking him to the alleged violence during the boycott. See id. 
168  Dyer, supra note 2, at 247; see also BRANCH, supra note 23, at 310–11. The fact that Dr. King had 
accepted and had already paid the state’s additional assessment may have added to the jury’s 
reluctance to convict Dr. King. It was virtually unheard of to prosecute a taxpayer in such a situation. 
BRANCH, supra note 23, 277. 
169  After a debate among the lawyers about whether to have Dr. King take the stand, they decided to go 
ahead and do so. GRAY, supra note 4, at 157; see also Dyer, supra note 2, at 256. 
170  Defense witnesses included R.D. Nesbitt, Sr., deacon and clerk at Dexter Avenue Church, who also 
monitored King’s financial transactions with the church, and a string of character witnesses testified 
for Dr. King, including the president of Morehouse College, the president of Tuskegee Institute, and a 
number of Black ministers and businessmen. Dyer, supra note 2, at 255–56; see also GRAY, supra note 
4, at 157–58. Jesse B. Blayton, Sr., a Black bank resident and certified CPA, also testified as the 
accounting expert who had audited Dr. King’s books. His analysis supported Dr. King’s and Chauncey 
Eskridge’s claims about the accuracy of his stated income and the taxes paid. Dyer, supra note 2, at 
256; see also GRAY, supra note 4, at 158. 
171  Fred Gray described both Dr. King and Nesbitt as very good witnesses, but states that Blayton, the 
accountant, “completely mesmerized the jurors.” GRAY, supra note 4, at 158. Dr. King’s daily diaries 
may have been persuasive to the jurors, as well. They constituted contemporary accounts and provided 
time lines, which can be particularly persuasive to juries. The author acknowledges the suggestion of 
Professor Shari Diamond on this point. The extensive coverage of the trial in the local papers focused 
on the evidence presented by both sides, thus implying that the evidence mattered in the outcome of 
the case. See, e.g., Coombes, supra note 93, at 2A; Ray Jenkins, King Case May Hinge on ‘Gifts’, ALA. 
JOURNAL, May 27, 1960, at 1A; Arthur Osgoode, Final Arguments Set in King Trial, THE MONTGOMERY 
ADVERTISER, May 28, 1960, at 1A; Arthur Osgoode, 999 Exhibits Entered as King Trial Opens, THE 
MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, May 26, 1960, at 1A; Judith Rushin, King Takes Stand in Perjury Case, ALA. 
JOURNAL, May 27, 1960, at 1A; Judith Rushin, Agent Told King No Fraud Evident, ALA. JOURNAL, May 
26, 1960, at 1A. 
172  One focus of the closing was that even the state’s key witness admitted there was no evidence of fraud, 
“[a]nd if there is no evidence of fraud, there is no evidence of the state’s case.” Dyer, supra note 2, at 
257. 
173  Id.  
174  Fred Gray reported that Ming’s closing argument was spellbinding to both the jury and the leading 
white members of the bar who were there to watch and listen. Gray also said that he overheard one of 
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Even with the state’s weak case, there are good reasons to question the “fair-
minded jurors” explanation of the acquittal. While there was widespread acceptance 
of that explanation, it is not consistent with the history and experience that caused 
Dr. King to think that his conviction was inevitable and that produced such universal 
surprise with the announcement of the verdict.175 After all, the case took place in 
1960 Alabama; the defendant was the most hated Black person in the state; it was 
tried before a segregationist judge and an all-white jury. As Dr. King knew all too 
well, that routinely led to conviction of innocent Black defendants.176   
Also, Dr. King’s counsel called a series of Black witnesses for the defense, 
including Dr. King himself, as well as expert and character witnesses.177 Since the 
norm was for white jurors to discount or simply ignore Blacks’ testimony, the race of 
those witnesses raises another question about the fair-minded jurors explanation for 
the acquittal.  
 Moreover, the “fair-minded jurors” hypothesis seems to depend on the jury 
consisting entirely of “racial moderates,” or at least dominated by them, all of whom 
were willing to take the evidence very seriously and express their views publicly 
through an acquittal.178 That scenario seems to be in tension with Montgomery’s 
                                                 
the “old established white lawyers” remark about the closing argument: “Now you have heard the 
master.” GRAY, supra note 4, at 154. Co-lead counsel Delaney emphasized to the jurors that their 
verdict would be heard throughout the world, implying that Montgomery’s reputation would be affected 
by their decisions. Dyer, supra note 2, at 257. Moreover, some jurors may have been afraid of this case 
as a possible precedent for the use of the tax laws to intimidate and punish severely political opponents. 
Co-lead counsel William Ming tried to appeal to that concern in his closing argument. Id. It could be 
understood as establishing a precedent for using the state tax laws to punish anyone state officials 
viewed as adversaries. That problem was exacerbated by the complicated and confusing nature of tax 
law, with many traps for the unwary. Those aspects of tax law made it a readily available weapon that 
could be used against political opponents. Some jurors may have seen the tax prosecution of Dr. King as 
an opening shot across the bow, the first time that political leaders used this law as a political tactic. A 
conviction could have served as a frightening precedent for silencing others. 
175  See supra Part II. 
176  See supra note 145 and accompanying text (discussing Dr. King’s expectation of conviction). 
Predictably, that pattern reasserted itself six months later. In the two trials in the libel suit related to 
the New York Times fund raising advertisement, four Black Montgomery ministers received a 
devastating defeat at the hands of an all-white jury. While their names appeared in the ad in question, 
the evidence indicated that they had not given permission for that and were not even aware of the ad 
until after its publication. Nevertheless, the respective juries found for the two plaintiffs and awarded 
each of them the requested $500,000 in damages. Through civil forfeiture, the ministers’ cars and a 
great deal of other property were seized and sold at auction. THORNTON, supra note 20, at 591; see also 
GRAY, supra note 4, at 116. After the Supreme Court reversed, in New York Times v. Sullivan, the 
ministers were reimbursed, in part, for their losses. GRAY, supra note 4, at 170. 
177  There are reasons to think Jesse Blayton especially might not have been so credible to jurors. He was 
Black, a member of the board of trustees of Dr. King’s Atlanta church, and his analysis agreed with Dr. 
King to the penny. GRAY, supra note 4, at 153. Moreover, Blayton received very substantial 
compensation for his analysis and testimony, a subject of considerable controversy within Dr. King’s 
camp. BRANCH, supra note 23, at 287–88, 293–94, 309. 
178  Professor Thornton defined “moderates” as on a spectrum between “liberals” seeking elimination of 
racial segregation laws and extreme segregationists—“all of them opposed arbitrary and highhanded 
actions directed toward blacks by white authorities . . . .” THORNTON, supra note 20, at 591. 







racial reality in 1960, as discussed below.179 In the post-boycott period, white 
supremacists gained control and silenced white moderates in the process.180 An 
acquittal would have been aberrational in that sense as well. 
Thus, there are reasons to suggest that the “fair-minded jury” explanation is 
insufficient by itself. In short, it would have been a rare departure from an extremely 
consistent pattern of all-white juries convicting Black defendants, regardless of their 
innocence.181 That invites consideration of another possible contributing factor that 
has quite different underlying assumptions. 
B. A Consequentialist Explanation: Jurors Concerned about Potential 
Negative Consequences for Whites of a Conviction (“Let this Sleeping Dog 
Lie”) 
When Governor Patterson was moving to indict Dr. King, Solicitor Thetford 
encouraged him to “let[] this sleeping dog lie” and allow Dr. King to remain in Atlanta, 
rather than risk making him a martyr.182 In the few years between the end of the bus 
boycott at the end of 1956 and the perjury indictment, Montgomery’s situation had 
changed significantly. Those changes provide the basis for a plausible complementary 
explanation for the acquittal. The most immediate and visible factor was Dr. King’s 
apparently permanent departure from Montgomery with his move back to Atlanta.183 
That move underlies the “letting this sleeping dog lie” aspect of the different 
explanation. Two other changes in the late 1950s suggest that the white jurors might 
have seen the acquittal as a measure that would help protect the “southern way of 
life.”184 Extreme segregationists had taken virtually complete control of the city.185 
Moreover, the Black community had fragmented and had failed to build on any 
momentum that the boycott might have provided.186 White supremacy was firmly 
ensconced. Dr. King’s jurors may have been so wedded to the new racial status quo 
that they were unwilling to risk the upheaval that his conviction might have 
caused.187  
                                                 
179  See infra Part III.B. That discussion is based largely on leading historian Mills Thornton’s account in 
Dividing Lines. J. THORNTON, supra note 20, at 96–118. 
180  THORNTON, supra note 20, at 112–13; GRAY, supra note 4, at 75. 
181  See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
182  THORNTON, supra note 20, at 113, 615 n.147. 
183  See infra notes 188–90 and accompanying text. 
184  See infra notes 185–86 and accompanying text. 
185  THORNTON, supra note 20, at 112–13. 
186  THORNTON, supra note 20, at 107–08. 
187  All of the changes seemed to be a matter of public knowledge, so the jurors were likely to have been 
aware of them. See Garrow, supra note 23, at 123 (stating King issued a statement to the press after 
announcing the move to his church). 
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At the start of 1960, Martin Luther King, Jr. left Montgomery and Alabama.188 
Many signs pointed to the permanence of that relocation, thus diminishing, if not 
ending, his threat to the city’s entrenched segregation.189 In November, 1959 Dr. King 
announced, to “a saddened black community and a jubilant white one,” that he was 
resigning as pastor of Dexter Avenue Church and moving to his home town of Atlanta, 
where he would join his father as co-pastor of Ebenezer Baptist Church.190 Part of the 
reason for the move was that his many responsibilities as a civil rights activist had 
left him insufficient time and energy to perform his role as a pastor as he intended.191  
Also, colleagues at the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) 
pressed Dr. King to play a much larger role in the organization that he served as 
president.192 SCLC’s struggles at that point led one historian to refer to its early 
period as “the fallow years.”193 The organization needed Dr. King’s strong leadership 
to build and sustain it.194 With SCLC headquartered in Atlanta, fulfilling that role 
meant moving there.195 Moreover, sharing the pulpit with his father meant that he 
would be able to devote more time and energy to SCLC than was possible while 
meeting the responsibilities of his Montgomery church.196 
Also, Dr. King was at the center of tensions within Montgomery’s Black 
community, and he hoped that his departure would defuse those tensions.197 Dr. King 
and other activists contemplated filing a school desegregation lawsuit in 
Montgomery, which caused substantial pushback within the Black community.198 
                                                 
188  THORNTON, supra note 20, at 106; see also BRANCH, supra note 23, at 266–67; GARROW, supra note 23, at 
122–23. 
189  See BRANCH, supra note 23, at 266 (describing King’s reasons for going to Atlanta and his trying to 
convince Abernathy to go with him); FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 20, at 51 (discussing SCLC organizational 
changes leading to his move to Atlanta); GARROW, supra note 23, at 123–24 (stressing that the move 
was due to increasing demand for SCLC leadership and due to meetings discussing future leadership 
opportunities in Atlanta). 
190  THORNTON, supra note 20, at 106; see also GARROW, supra note 23, at 122–23. 
191  As Dr. King was increasingly torn between his responsibilities at his Montgomery church and his ever-
expanding role in the civil rights movement, his guilt about not adequately fulfilling his obligations to 
his congregation grew. His meticulous preparation and memorization of his sermons gave way to 
scribbling a few notes before preaching. He simply could not sustain his original vision of serving as 
pastor to his local church. GARROW, supra note 23, at 122. 
192  FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 20, at 51; GARROW, supra note 23, at 122–24.  
193  FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 20, at 37. Between 1957–60, SCLC barely raised enough money to keep itself 
afloat, and for much of that time was operating with only one staff member and with a lack of real 
leadership. Id. at 47–49. 
194  See id. at 37–38. 
195  BRANCH, supra note 23, at 266; GARROW, supra note 23, at 122. 
196  Dr. King moved to Atlanta to devote more time to SCLC and to not be obligated to preach every 
Sunday. FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 20, at 51; GARROW, supra note 23, at 123. 
197  Dr. Thornton suggested that Dr. King’s departure was largely to remove the pressure that Black 
teachers and other Blacks were facing as a result of his threat to file a school desegregation lawsuit. 
THORNTON, supra note 20, at 106. 
198  Governor Patterson claimed that he would shut down the state’s schools rather than integrate them, 
thus leading to significant Black opposition to the suit that included many members of Dr. King’s 
church. THORNTON, supra note 20, at 103–06. 







Black teachers were especially vocal in opposing Dr. King because they feared that 
such litigation would cost them their jobs.199 
At the same time that Dr. King left Montgomery, seemingly for good, white 
supremacists had assumed virtually total control of the city.200 The increased hostility 
between the races that the boycott engendered enabled the extreme segregationists 
to expand the legal regime separating Blacks and whites. Within a few months after 
the bus boycott ended, the city commissioners had further institutionalized 
segregation by passing an ordinance that sought to prevent social interaction between 
the races, especially where there would be physical proximity and the potential for 
actual physical contact.201 
In the process of dominating the city, the extreme segregationists also silenced 
racial moderates.202 One scholar describes the extremists as imposing a “reign of 
terror” on white moderates and liberals, subjecting them to harassment and 
ostracism.203 The message seemed clear that the bus situation was aberrational, and 
the Jim Crow system was to remain in effect in all other realms of social life.204 
 Montgomery’s judicial system also reflected the racist status quo. In early 
1957, in the aftermath of the bus boycott, racists bombed several Black homes and 
churches.205 Two of the alleged bombers went to trial, based on their confessions and 
their having led the police to bombing materials in locations which only the 
perpetrators could have known.206 Notwithstanding this powerful evidence, the all-
white jury quickly acquitted them on all counts.207  
                                                 
199  Id. at 105–06.     
200  Id. at 112–13. 
201  The ordinance made it:  
 
[U]nlawful for white and colored persons to play together, or, in company with 
each other . . . in any game of cards, dice, dominoes, checkers, pool, billiards, 
softball, basketball, baseball, football, golf, track, and at swimming pools, 
beaches, lakes or ponds or any other game or games or athletic contest or 
contests, either indoors or outdoors.  
 
Montgomery, Ala., Ordinance 15-57 (Mar. 19, 1957), quoted in Kennedy, supra note 124, at 1057. 
Segregation was also still in effect in “employment, restrooms, water fountains, lunch counters, hotels, 
and restaurants.” Coleman, et al., supra note 22, at 720 n.150 (citing HENRY HAMPTON & STEVE FAYER, 
VOICES OF FREEDOM: AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT FROM THE 1950S THROUGH THE 
1980S, at 33 (1991)). 
202  See THORNTON, supra note 20, at 96–99.  
203  Id. at 97. 
204  Coleman et al., supra note 22, at 692. 
205  THORNTON, supra note 20, at 94. 
206  Id. at 95. 
207  Id. at 96. Two circuit judges stated publicly that the jury rendered “a verdict which the court would 
itself have given.” Id. One of those judges was Eugene Carter, the judge in Dr. King’s anti-boycott case. 
Kennedy, supra note 124, at 1029; see also THORNTON, supra note 20, at 96. 
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To make matters worse, the Black community’s activism diminished in the 
aftermath of the boycott.208 It largely failed in the few initiatives it undertook.209 Its 
energy had dissipated from the boycott. The remarkable unity of the Black 
community that prevailed during much of the bus boycott began to fray toward the 
end of that movement.210 Divisions and tensions among the leaders grew, as the 
Montgomery Improvement Association struggled to define an agenda after the bus 
boycott.211  The deep divisions within the Black community that pre-existed the bus 
boycott began to resurface as well.212 Even the MIA’s seemingly most successful 
initiative of the late 1950s failed in the end. Its suit challenging the segregation in 
the city’s parks won in court; but city officials closed all the parks at the end of 
1958.213 Judge Frank Johnson, who had upheld the initial claim, concluded that he 
did not have the power to order reopening of the parks.214 
 All of these facts suggests that Montgomery’s extreme segregationists were 
having their way by 1960: “Thus the white supremacist who surveyed the situation 
in Montgomery at the beginning of 1960 could do so with considerable satisfaction.”215 
                                                 
208  THORNTON, supra note 20, at 101–02. 
209  See id. 
210  Id. at 99–100. He describes the concerns of E.D. Nixon, one of the founders of the MIA and its 
treasurer, about the way the organization’s funds were being handled. Uriah Fields’s accusations also 
caused dissension within the movement. See supra Part I.A. and text accompanying notes 10–34. 
Blacks who were “opposed to racial strife and [sought] to work with city officials for the expansion and 
improvement of [B]lack institutions” formed a rival organization to the Montgomery Improvement 
Association called the Restoration and Amelioration Association. THORNTON, supra note 20, at 102. 
211  THORNTON, supra note 20, at 101. 
212  Id. at 107. 
213  Id. at 101–02. Approximately half of the parks reopened in 1965, but the others never reopened because 
they had been sold or were being used for other purposes. In summarizing the new status quo that 
existed when Dr. King left Montgomery, Professor Thornton said that:  
 
Despite the logic, the passion, and the bravado of King’s farewell address, 
however, it was apparent that he was merely whistling past the graveyard . . . . 
[H]is insistence that the black citizenry must not yield to [segregationist 
zealots] could not help but lose much of its force as even his most ardent local 
admirers came to understand that, in leaving Montgomery, he himself just 
had. 
 
Id. at 107. Fred Gray had a more optimistic view of that period. He suggested that the civil rights 
movement still flourished in Montgomery, with some desegregation of buses, parks, and the airport. 
GRAY, supra note 4, at 144. 
214  THORNTON, supra note 20, at 102. 
215  Id. at 112.  
 
Once we have examined the events in the city in the years just after the end of 
the boycott, the notion advanced by the Citizens’ Councils in January 1959, 
that history would record Montgomery as the place where the tide in the civil 
rights battle was turned and ‘integration efforts were stopped cold,’ seems a 
good deal less peculiar . . . . The forward march of desegregation, which had 
appeared at the end of 1959 to be about to create a breakthrough, did indeed 
seem to have been halted in its tracks. 







In that context, perhaps the question for the perjury jurors became: with Martin 
Luther King, Jr., having departed the state, the extreme segregationists firmly in 
control, and the Black activist community in disarray, why risk disturbing the racial 
status quo by convicting Dr. King of a serious crime.216 If the jury did raise that 
question for itself, the jury would likely have turned to the city’s recent history as a 
guide. 
Montgomery’s segregationists had learned early on that prosecuting and 
convicting Black activists did not necessarily help protect the “southern way of life.”  
The arrest and prosecution of Rosa Parks for refusing to give up her seat on a 
segregated bus triggered the year-long boycott along with the litigation holding the 
bus segregation laws unconstitutional.217 
During the bus boycott, officials indicted many leaders and prosecuted and 
convicted Dr. King for violating and old anti-boycott statute.218 They sought to 
undermine the movement by convicting its leadership.219 However, the tactic 
backfired, as it “spurred the black community to further displays of unity, confidence, 
and self-sacrifice.”220 Those indicted turned themselves in to the police, taking their 
                                                 
 
Id.  
216  Dr. King’s arrest was enough to send shock waves through the Black community in Atlanta. BRANCH, 
supra note 23, at 276–77. 
217  See KING, supra note 47, at 50–51. (“The bus protest . . . was the culmination of a slowly developing 
process. Mrs. Parks’ arrest was the precipitating factor rather than the cause of the protest.”); 
DAYBREAK OF FREEDOM: THE MONTGOMERY BUS BOYCOTT 8–10 (Stewart Burns ed., 1997). 
218  Kennedy, supra note 124, at 1029; THORNTON, supra note 20, at 84 (“On February 21 the grand jury 
returned indictments of eighty-nine blacks, twenty-four of whom were ministers, for the misdemeanor 
of conspiring to boycott.”). 
219  The county solicitor, William Thetford, was the prosecutor in the perjury case four years later. He 
recalled later that he was “deeply dubious” about the anti-boycott prosecution because it was unlikely 
to be effective. Id. at 604; J. Mills Thornton III, Challenge and Response in the Montgomery Bus Boycott 
of 1955–1956, 67 ALA. REV. 40, 101 (2014). Conviction would only lead to a small fine or short jail 
sentence, punishments too minor to deter the protest. However, Thetford did not explain why he 
proceeded with the prosecution if that was his view about its likely impact. 
220  Kennedy, supra note 124, at 1029. The prosecutor proceeded with the trial of Dr. King, who was 
convicted and fined. When it became clear that the conviction had strengthened the Black community’s 
resolve, the prosecutor decided not to prosecute any of the others who had been indicted. See 
Photograph of Dr. King and Arthur Shores, in HELEN SHORES LEE & BARBARA S. SHORES, THE GENTLE 
GIANT OF DYNAMITE HILL 160 (2012) (caption of the photograph reads, “Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., 
shaking hands with his lawyer, Arthur D. Shores, as they stood in front of cheering followers after 
King’s conviction for his part in the boycott in Montgomery, 1956.”). In another incident, the police 
arrested Dr. King when he was driving as part of the “car pool” for a minor (and probably non-existent) 
traffic violation. GARROW, supra note 23, at 55. This was part of a “get tough” policy seeking to disrupt 
and perhaps destroy the alternative transportation system that was central to sustaining the boycott. 
THORNTON, supra note 20, at 73–77. Initially, the police were going to keep Dr. King in jail overnight, 
since there was no bail money available in the evening. When the word of the arrest got out, however, 
angry Black residents surrounded the jail, and the jailer changed his mind and released his prisoner. 
Coleman, supra note 22 at 713, n.88; GARROW, supra note 23, at 56; Robert J. Glennon, The Role of Law 
in the Civil Rights Movement, 9 L. & HIST. REV. 59, 67 (1991). 
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arrest as a badge of honor.221 The prosecution was counterproductive on another level 
as well. It turned a local news story into a national and international one.222 That 
provided additional support for the thousands of Black residents who were continuing 
to sacrifice in order to bring about change on the buses.223 
 The counter-productivity of the anti-boycott prosecution did not bode well for 
the governor’s plan in initiating the perjury prosecution a few years later. By 1960, 
Martin Luther King, Jr. had a national and international reputation.224 And the 
punishment involved was far greater than was at stake in the anti-boycott trial. As a 
result, the risk of martyrdom and backlash was far greater than with the earlier 
conviction. A relatively quiescent local Black community might have been aroused 
and unified in a way it had not been for years. The jurors had reason to fear that the 
Black community’s unity, discipline, courage, and resilience that sustained the bus 
boycott could be aroused again by the conviction of Martin Luther King, Jr.225 The 
national and international reaction in support of Dr. King might also have made the 
conviction very costly for the proponents of the racial status quo. The city’s business 
community had shown deep concern about that goal during the bus boycott, and there 
was good reason to continue that focus on building a good public image.226   
In an interview many years after the trial, solicitor Thetford said that he had 
been secretly pleased that the jury had acquitted Dr. King.227 He felt that the 
acquittal was “finally ridding his jurisdiction of the troublesome minister.”228 If the 
jurors imagined that Dr. King’s move to Atlanta meant that he would not continue to 
make trouble in Montgomery, they were largely correct.229 The heavy presence of 
Blacks in the courtroom could have alerted the jurors to the risks of convicting Dr. 
                                                 
221  Kennedy, supra note 218, at 1029. 
222  The boycott made the front page of the New York Times for the first time, as well as network television 
coverage. Id. at 1029; GARROW, supra note 23, at 66; LAWRENCE REDDICK, CRUSADER WITHOUT VIOLENCE: 
A BIOGRAPHY OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 139–41 (1959). 
223  Kennedy, supra note 218, at 1029. 
224  See, e.g., GRAY, supra note 4, at 145; see also BRANCH, supra note 23, at 203, 385; FAIRCLOUGH, supra 
note 20, at 37. 
225  Coleman et al., supra note 22, at 675. They could also easily have imagined that a conviction and the 
Black community’s response to it could have taken the kind of toll on the city’s reputation that occurred 
with the bus boycott. See id. at 692–93; THORNTON, supra note 20, at 80–83. 
226  See discussion infra note 230 based on Thornton’s Dividing Lines, pp. 80–81.  
227  THORNTON, supra note 199 at 615, n.147. 
228  Id. Thetford’s statement was certainly self-serving and possibly disingenuous. After all, he had failed to 
convict the most hated Black person in the state, even with the usual advantage of an all-white jury. A 
Black defendant tried before an all-white jury in that time and place usually meant virtually certain 
conviction, no matter what the charge and no matter what the evidence showed. See supra Part II 
(discussing Dr. King’s sense before the trial of the inevitability of his conviction). 
229  Dr. King did not return to Alabama to lead a movement until 1963, and that was in Birmingham, not 
Montgomery. See THORNTON, supra note 20, at 141–379. In 1965, he led the voting rights march to 
Montgomery; but the central focus was Selma where such a small portion of the Black population had 
been permitted to register. See id. at 380–499. While the jurors might understandably have focused on 
future implications for their city of Montgomery, Governor Patterson might have seen Dr. King as a 
continuing threat to Alabama, a relatively short distance from his new home in Atlanta. 







King and the relief available in his return to Atlanta.230 At the start of the trial, 
approximately two-thirds of the spectators in the courtroom were Black.231 From the 
announcement of the indictments to the jury’s verdict, the reaction of the Black 
community to the prosecution was strong and very visible. Officials understood how 
provocative this prosecution was to the Black community.232 It is quite plausible that 
some or all of the jurors shared the prosecutor’s secret views. They too may have 
preferred to see Dr. King back in Georgia rather than in an Alabama prison, where 
his incarceration might have produced Blacks’ reactions that whites could not 
control.233  
However, if the state had presented a strong case that Dr. King had perjured 
himself by lying on his state tax return, the picture would have been quite different. 
Even if the jurors were seriously worried about the consequences of a conviction, an 
acquittal would have required the act of jury nullification.234  While white juries in 
the South often acquitted obviously guilty white defendants accused of a crime 
against Blacks, it would have been extraordinary to ignore the judge’s instructions 
and the evidence against a Black defendant, especially when that defendant had been 
the leader of the Civil Rights Movement in the state. Since neither the weak case nor 
                                                 
230  On a related point, jurors who were businesses leaders, owners, or otherwise concerned about the city’s 
economic climate may have been especially concerned about possible disruption, just as many whites 
were during the bus boycott. See generally id. at 80–81. Business progressives also shared a concern 
about the city’s reputation and its attractiveness to northern industry as a relocation destination. They 
made that concern public a year later when “freedom riders” traveling on interstate buses were greeted 
by violent mobs when they arrived in Montgomery. Id. at 123. There was an effort to attract industry to 
Montgomery, specifically, and the South, generally, during this period. Supporters of that goal believed 
that racial peace and stability were required for companies to relocate there. Id. 
231  Dyer, supra note 2, at 254. 
232  As early as the May 16 arraignment, Montgomery officials were aware of the tense and potentially 
explosive nature of the prosecution. Sheriff’s deputies on horseback, along with state troopers and city 
policemen, stood guard outside the courthouse in case of racial demonstrations. BRANCH, supra note 23, 
at 301. Immediately prior to reading the verdict, the judge warned that there would be no 
demonstrations inside or outside the courtroom, and stationed police outside the courtroom to enforce 
his statement. Coombes, supra note 93, at 2A. The judge also ordered the release of spectators one row 
at a time. Dyer, supra note 2, at 258. 
233  The riots all over the country after Dr. King’s death perhaps shows that the jurors would have been 
wise to be concerned about the Black community’s possible response to a felony conviction with a 
substantial prison term. See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 20, at 382; TAYLOR BRANCH, AT CANAAN’S EDGE: 
AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1965–68, 767 (2006). The acquittal gave Montgomery’s Black community a 
cause for great celebration. At the same time, it may have given many of the city’s whites a sense of 
relief, as it calmed the racial waters that Governor Patterson had stirred up with his prosecution of 
Martin Luther King, Jr. 
234  Jury nullification is defined as a jury’s “knowing and deliberate rejection of the evidence or refusal to 
apply the law either because the jury wants to send a message about some social issue that is larger 
than the case itself or because the result dictated by law is contrary to the jury’s sense of justice, 
morality, or fairness.” Jury Nullification, LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/jury_nullification (last visited Jan. 9, 2017). 
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the consequentialist approach seems sufficient by itself, the plausible explanation 
points to the convergence of those two factors producing the acquittal. 
IV.   THE COUNTER-FACTUAL: DR. KING’S HYPOTHETICAL CONVICTION 
In referring to the perjury trial several years later, Dr. King wrote, “I can recall 
what may very well have been a turning point in my life as a participant in the Negro 
struggle in the South.”235 This section considers possible implications of that turning 
point—the trial, ending with a conviction rather than an acquittal. This counter-
factual discussion is suggestive only. Some aspects of the analysis seem likely because 
the participants involved at the time discussed contingency plans, such as appealing 
a possible conviction. Others can be inferred based on previous history, such as Dr. 
King’s conviction during the bus boycott for violating the state anti-boycott statute. 
Still others can be considered in light of actual events that followed, such as Martin 
Luther King, Jr.’s assassination. Because of Dr. King’s central role in the Civil Rights 
Movement, the “what if” question can be considered in respect to him personally as 
well as in respect to the movements with which he was associated. 
A. Implications for Martin Luther King, Jr.  
The impact on Dr. King of a conviction in that trial relates to both the 
subsequent aspects of the prosecution as well as the punishment that would have 
resulted. The former involves the appeals of the conviction, the possible sentence, and 
a second trial that could have followed. The implications of incarceration include the 
constraints on Dr. King’s activism and the personal risks—both physical and 
psychological—of his imprisonment. 
Dr. King and his lawyers planned to appeal the conviction that they thought 
was inevitable. The motions made by the defense throughout the proceedings were 
designed to lay the foundation for such an appeal.236 Dr. King had confidence in his 
innocence. The public, practical, and psychological impacts would have been too great 
to let a conviction stand without a fight. A lengthy prison sentence would have made 
an appeal even more imperative. Moreover, a conviction in the first trial would have 
paved the way for a second trial—one related to Dr. King’s 1958 state income tax 
returns. 
In anticipation of a likely appeal, the lawyers filed numerous motions that the 
trial judge denied but would be preserved to serve as potential grounds for appeal.237 
The lawyers challenged the constitutionality of the jury selection process that 
                                                 
235  KUNTSLER, supra note 4, at xxiii.  
236  See Dyer, supra note 2, at 252. 
237  MICHAEL E. TIGAR & JANE B. TIGAR, FEDERAL APPEALS: JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE, 292–98 (3d. ed., 
1999); see Dyer, supra 145, at 253–55. “His lawyers have laid extensive groundwork for appeal, 
including numerous racial angles raised in pretrial hearing last week.” Margaret Shannon, Jury 
Acquits King in Perjury Trial, ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 29, 1960, at 22. 







produced an all-white jury.238 Their motion for a directed verdict at the end of the 
state’s case argued that the state had not made a case that should go to the jury.239 
This was a claim that the evidence was insufficient—that no rational jury could have 
found that the prosecution had proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt.240 
The challenge to the jury selection process had little chance of success. The 
constitutional challenge to the all-white jury was based on the fact that the 
prosecution excluded the only three Blacks in the venire.241 The selection process 
resembled a peremptory challenge, where no reason for exclusion was necessary.242 
That process was constitutionally viable at the time. A half decade later, in Swain v. 
Alabama, the US Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge to a claim of 
racial discrimination in prosecutors’ use of peremptory challenges.243 The Court 
pointed to the history and purpose of the peremptory challenge as emphasizing the 
need to permit some challenges that do not require any explanation whatsoever.244 
                                                 
238  Dyer, supra note 2, at 254.  
239  Id. at 255. 
240  Id. 
241  Id. at 254. 
242  According to a 1965 court case quoting the statute, Alabama’s jury selection process for non-capital 
crimes at the time was as follows:  
 
[Section] 60. Mode of selecting and empaneling juries in criminal cases other 
than capital cases. -- In every criminal case the jury shall be drawn, selected 
and empaneled as follows: Upon the trial by jury in any court of any person 
indicted for a misdemeanor, or felonies not punished capitally, or in case of 
appeals from lower courts, the court shall require two lists of all the regular  
jurors empaneled for the week, who are competent to try the defendant, to be 
made and the solicitor shall be required first to strike from the list the name 
of one juror and the defendant shall strike two, and they shall continue to 
strike off names alternately until only twelve jurors remain on the list, and 
these twelve thus selected shall be the jury charged with the trial of the case.  
 
Donahey v. Montgomery, 43 Ala. App. 20 (1965). This framework approximated a peremptory challenge 
approach, since the lawyers did not have to explain their reasons for excluding potential jurors, as 
would be necessary under a “challenge for cause” approach with a specified number of peremptory 
challenges available. Defense counsel may have been able to exclude potential jurors who revealed the 
most extreme racism, who would likely have voted for conviction regardless of the evidence. That might 
have produced a somewhat more moderate jury than would otherwise have been the case. 
243  Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). 
244  The Court stated:  
 
[i]n the light of the purpose of the peremptory system and the function it serves 
in a pluralistic society in connection with the institution of jury trial, we cannot 
hold that the Constitution requires an examination of the prosecutor's reasons 
for the exercise of his challenges in any given case. The presumption in any 
particular case must be that the prosecutor is using the State's challenges to 
obtain a fair and impartial jury to try the case before the court.  
 
Swain, 380 U.S. at 222. It was not until the Court decided Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), that 
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Similarly, an appeal based on the insufficiency of the evidence would have had little 
chance of success, given the composition and inclination of the Alabama appellate 
courts, the straightforward legal issue, and the high bar in winning an appeal based 
on inadequate evidence.245  
If Dr. King’s conviction had been affirmed on appeal, the prosecutor 
presumably would have proceeded with a second trial, based on the indictment 
related to the 1958 state tax return.246 In theory, a different jury could have acquitted 
Dr. King even though the first one convicted him; but there would have been little 
reason to expect that to happen. The second jury would almost certainly have been 
composed entirely of whites, coming from the same culture as the first.247 
If Dr. King’s conviction on both charges had been affirmed on appeal, he would 
have received a sentence of two to five years for each.248 So he could have served from 
four to ten years. With Governor Patterson seeking to eliminate Dr. King from the 
movement, the prosecutor would likely have sought the longest sentence possible. 
With the bias that state judges demonstrated routinely, a lengthy sentence seemed 
likely.249 
As a result, Dr. King might have been “out of circulation,” as he referred to it, 
for a quite substantial period—possibly the entire decade of the 1960s.250 While his 
numerous stays in jail had little impact on his leadership role, they were all for very 
brief periods.251 It seems highly unlikely that Dr. King could have continued his 
central role in strategic decision-making, his inspirational impact, or his exceptional 
fund-raising efforts during an extended prison sentence.252 
                                                 
it permitted constitutional challenges to a pattern of using peremptory challenges to exclude potential 
jurors based on race. 
245    See supra Part II (discussion of Dr. King’s view of local courts); see generally Friedman, supra note 132. 
Appeals courts rarely reverse based on insufficient evidence, as they believe the jury is in a better 
position to make that decision than an appeals judge, since the jury was actually present when the 
evidence was presented.  
246  Solicitor Thetford said that he was not proceeding with the second trial because of the acquittal in the 
first one and the similarity of the evidence related to the 1958 tax return. THORNTON, supra note 20. 
Moreover, Governor Patterson presumably would have ordered him to go ahead with a second trial if 
the first had produced a conviction. 
247  See supra pp. 259–60 (discussion of the all-white jury). 
248  See supra text accompanying note 94. 
249  See, e.g., KUNSTLER, supra note 4, at 102 (recalling Dr. King saying, “I don’t mind violating an unjust 
state injunction, but I won’t violate a federal one”); THORNTON, supra note 199, at 89–90 (discussing Dr. 
King’s conviction for violating the anti-boycott statute); see supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text. 
250  Dr. King used that term to describe the situation in a letter to Jackie Robinson. Letter from Martin 
Luther King, Jr. to Jackie Robinson (June 19, 1960), THE MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. PAPERS PROJECT, 
http://okra.stanford.edu/transcription/document_images/Vol05Scans/19June1960_ToJackieRobinson.pd
f (last visited Feb. 28, 2017). 
251  Dr. King was jailed an average of two times per year throughout his career. See BENNETT, supra note 
113, at 243 (listing Dr. King’s “record of arrests”); THE KING YEARS: A TIMELINE OF MARTIN LUTHER 
KING, JR., THE KING LEGACY, http://www.thekinglegacy.org/content/king-years (listing many of his 
arrests, along with dates he entered and exited jail) (last visited Oct. 26, 2106). 
252  Dr. King recognized the likely limitations that a prison sentence would have imposed on his 
involvement in the movement. In a letter to Jackie Robinson he explained the additional need for 







Moreover, a conviction and a prison sentence would have posed significant 
personal risks for Dr. King.253 The shame and humiliation he felt as a result of the 
charges would likely have been exacerbated by a finding of guilt, followed by 
punishment.254 Confinement, with the possibility of relative isolation, was painful for 
Dr. King even in his short jail stays.255 A lengthy prison term could have taken a 
substantial toll on his psyche, especially since the pressures of his work already 
produced periodic bouts of depression.256 
In addition, Dr. King could have faced physical dangers in prison. If white 
racist prisoners had access to him, his life was threatened. Prison guards represented 
a similar threat. Later in 1960, Dr. King was incarcerated in a Georgia prison.257 His 
family had real fears for his life.258 There was great relief when supporters were able 
to secure a quick release, before any harm could come to him.259 A much longer time 
in a southern prison posed much greater risks of physical harm to Dr. King.260 
                                                 
fundraising for his defense “because I knew that I would be out of circulation for a while, and that I 
could not raise as much money for the Southern Christian Leadership Conference as I would ordinarily 
raise.” Letter to Jackie Robinson, supra note 250, at 476. This is not to suggest that he would have been 
necessarily been wholly removed from the movement. Outside contact might have continued; but it is 
likely that Governor Patterson and prison officials would have tried to minimize Dr. King’s continued 
involvement in the Civil Rights Movement. 
253  Fred Gray suggested that conviction would have been “devastating” because it would have undermined 
Dr. King’s credibility throughout the South. It would have tainted this leader of thousands of Black 
people as a dishonest man who failed to pay his taxes. GRAY, supra note 4, at 148. It would also have 
undermined his development as an international figure. Id. at 149. 
254  See supra Part II.A. 
255  See GARROW, supra note 23, at 243, 331, 670. 
256  Id. at 134–35, 421, 602–03; BRANCH, supra note 23, at 579–80. 
257  After being placed on probation for a previous traffic incident, Dr. King was arrested for a sit-in. 
GARROW, supra note 23, at 143; MAURICE C. DANIELS, HORACE T. WARD: DESEGREGATION OF THE 
UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA, CIVIL RIGHTS ADVOCACY, AND JURISPRUDENCE 166 (2001). His probation was 
revoked, and he was sentenced to four months hard labor at a maximum security prison. MAURICE C. 
DANIELS, SAVING THE SOUL OF GEORGIA: DONALD L. HOLLOWELL AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 
115–17 (2013). 
258  GARROW, supra note 23, at 146. 
259  Attorneys Donald Hollowell and Horace Ward quickly filed an appeal in the original case, and were 
able to secure his release on bond after eight days in prison. DANIELS, supra note 257, at 115. As the 
same time, Senator John Kennedy intervened, calling Coretta Scott King to comfort her, and eventually 
calling the judge on Dr. King’s case. Id. at 177–78. While the lawyers appeal was the technical cause for 
Dr. King’s release, Kennedy is often given much of the credit. Id. at 118–19. 
260  It is even possible that if Dr. King had been convicted and the conviction had been overturned on 
appeal, he would have left SCLC and returned to serving as a full-time pastor. Before the ordeal of the 
trial, he expressed having second thoughts about whether his activism was worth all the trouble it was 
causing his family. In a letter to Daniel Wynn dated February 24, 1960, he said: “So often in my dark 
and dreary moments, I end up asking concerning my involvement in the civil rights struggle: ‘Is it 
worth it?  At other times I find myself asking, ‘are you able?’” See Letter from Martin Luther King, Jr. 
to Daniel Wynn (Feb. 24, 1960), in THE PAPERS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. VOLUME V: THRESHOLD OF A 
NEW DECADE, JANUARY 1959–DECEMBER 1960, 375 (Clayborne Carson et al. eds., 2005). It is possible 
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B. Impacts on the Civil Rights Movement and Organizations 
By removing Martin Luther King, Jr. from the Civil Rights Movement at a 
critical time, there were likely to have been impacts on the movement as well.261 The 
concerns of the “let sleeping dogs lie” advocates provide a starting point for 
considering possible impacts. Beyond that, Dr. King’s Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference (SLSC) would have changed its leadership, with accompanying 
implications. 
A conviction could have made Dr. King a martyr and produced outrage in the 
Black community.262 In light of Dr. King’s stature by 1960, that reaction could have 
extended throughout Alabama and beyond.263 In Montgomery, for example, a 
relatively fractured and divided Black community could have been re-unified and re-
energized to mount protests on issues Dr. King raised, such as voting rights and 
pervasive segregation.264 Those efforts might have even escalated beyond those of the 
bus boycott experience. In turn, the dominant white segregationists could have 
mounted counter-initiatives. With likely white violence, Blacks’ response was 
uncertain. Whites had used violence during and after the boycott, and, at Dr. King’s 
insistence, Blacks had responded non-violently.265 This time, disillusioned Blacks 
could have lost faith in the non-violence that Dr. King preached. While the specific 
actions of the Black community in Montgomery and elsewhere were unpredictable, it 
seems likely that a conviction would have elicited a dramatic response.266 
In the meantime, SCLC Vice President Ralph Abernathy would have taken 
over the leadership of the organization.267 He shared his colleague’s beliefs and goals, 
and the two of them had worked very closely together since the Montgomery bus 
                                                 
that his acquittal revitalized him and his faith in the work that he was doing and gave him strength to 
continue his efforts. See supra text accompanying note 158. 
261  Dr. King downplayed the potential impact of his incarceration on the Civil Rights Movement. In a letter 
to Jackie Robinson dated June 19, 1960, he stressed that “in the long run of history, it does not matter 
whether Martin Luther King spends ten years in jail, but it does matter whether the student 
movement continues, and it does matter whether the Negro is able to get the ballot in the South.” 
Letter to Jackie Robinson, supra note 250, at 476. 
262  See supra Sections I., III.B. (discussing Solicitor Thetford’s opposition to the prosecution and concern as 
a possible motivation for the jurors’ acquittal). 
263  See, e.g., GRAY, supra note 4, at 145; see also BRANCH, supra note 23, at 203, 385; FAIRCLOUGH, supra 
note 20, at 37. 
264  See supra Section I.B. (discussing Dr. King’s plans for continuing to work in Alabama after his move to 
Atlanta a few months earlier). 
265  See Christopher Coleman et al., supra note 22, at 680, 695–97; see also THORNTON, supra note 199, at 
93–95. Many Black people in Alabama did not subscribe to non-violence as a core principle, and 
followed Dr. King’s urgings only out of commitment to him. See e.g., Coleman et al., supra note 22, at 
688, 696; ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., 24–25 (1995). While Dr. King would 
undoubtedly have continued to preach non-violence to his followers, this kind of insult to the 
community might have made that plea less than fully effective.  
266  Whatever the nature of that reaction, it was potentially very problematic for the white community. See 
supra Section III.B. 
267  FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 20, at 257, 385. 







boycott.268 Within the Black community, Abernathy had a reputation as an effective 
preacher and leader; but he did not have nearly the stature of Martin Luther King, 
Jr. in either the Black or white community.269  
As Ralph Abernathy would have taken the reins of SCLC, he would also have 
had to work out relationships with other organizations. Dr. King had managed 
delicate and often contentious relationships with the NAACP and the decade-old 
Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC).270 That challenge would have 
been in Abernathy’s hands, with unpredictable outcomes. 
Dr. King had also served as what he called a “fireman,” responding to calls 
from local activists for his assistance when their movements had stalled.271 In 1962, 
activists in Albany called on him.272 In 1965, it was a coalition of local organizations 
in Chicago that sought his assistance.273 Ultimately, he died answering the call of 
Memphis sanitation workers in 1968.274  Those calls for assistance were personal and 
depended heavily on Dr. King’s stature and his accomplishments. With him in prison, 
it is not as likely that local activists would have called on SCLC for its assistance. 
                                                 
268  BRANCH, supra note 233, at 197; Abernathy became President of SCLC after Dr. King’s assassination in 
1968. See Paul Good, No Man Can Fill Dr. King’s Shoes—But Abernathy Tries, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 
1968, at SM28. In Abernathy’s acceptance speech as President of SCLC, he spoke about how he was not 
Dr. King, but he would continue to carry out his work and aim towards the same goals as Dr. King, just 
as he had done while Dr. King was alive. DONZALEIGH ABERNATHY, PARTNERS TO HISTORY: MARTIN 
LUTHER KING, JR., RALPH DAVID ABERNATHY, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 54 (1999). 
269  See Good, supra note 268, at SM28. That also limited his fund-raising ability, a responsibility that Dr. 
King carried throughout his career. See, e.g., FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 20, at 49, 70, 96–97, 256, 287, 345; 
GARROW, supra note 23, at 151, 153, 155, 234, 429, 461–63; LEWIS, supra note 103, at 120, 156. 
270  See, e.g., GARROW, supra note 23, at 71–72, 97–103, 137–38, 166–67, 409–10, 423–24; BRANCH, supra 
note 23, at 488, 557–58, 578–79, 613–14, 829–31, 887; see generally CLAYBORNE CARSON, IN STRUGGLE: 
SNCC AND THE BLACK AWAKENING OF THE 1960S 186–87 (1981). 
271  BRANCH, supra note 233, at 632. 
272  See generally BRANCH, supra note 233, at 529–58, 602–39; GARROW, supra note 23, at 173–230; DAVID L. 
LEWIS, KING: A BIOGRAPHY 143–45 (Univ. of Ill. Press 2d ed., 1978). 
273  See generally THE CHICAGO FREEDOM MOVEMENT: MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. AND CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIVISM 
IN THE NORTH (Mary Lou Finley, Bernard LaFayette, Jr., James R. Ralph, Jr., & Pam Smith eds., 2016); 
ALAN B. ANDERSON & GEORGE W. PICKERING, CONFRONTING THE COLOR LINE: THE BROKEN PROMISE OF 
THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN CHICAGO 153, 160–64, 172–78, 188–94 (1986); BRANCH, supra note 233, 
at 501–22; JAMES R. RALPH, JR., NORTHERN PROTEST: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., CHICAGO, AND THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1, 7, 28–91 (1993); Leonard S. Rubinowitz & Kathryn Shelton, Non-Violent Direct 
Action and the Legislative Process: The Chicago Freedom Movement and the Federal Fair Housing Act, 
41 IND. L. REV. 663, 664–72 (2008). 
274  See generally BRANCH, supra note 233, 683–766; GARROW, supra note 23, at 604–24; MICHAEL K. HONEY, 
GOING DOWN JERICHO ROAD: THE MEMPHIS STRIKE, MARTIN LUTHER KING’S LAST CAMPAIGN (2007). To 
further extend the counterfactual, it is also possible that King may have continued doing Civil Rights 
work after he was released from prison, and could possibly have continued doing so for a long time, had 
he not been in Memphis where he was killed in 1968. 
278      Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality           [5:2 
 
All of this suggests that Dr. King was a very strong presence as president of 
SCLC. While his role can be overstated, his absence from the fray could have changed 
civil rights history in important but unknowable ways.275  
CONCLUSION 
The perjury charges against Martin Luther King, Jr. were almost certainly 
part of Governor John Patterson’s effort to derail the Civil Rights Movement in 
Alabama.276 The opportunistic legal maneuver made Dr. King the first person in 
Alabama ever prosecuted for perjury related to taxes. As a lawyer, Governor 
Patterson regularly turned to the courts as a method for preserving the “southern 
way of life.”277 The perjury case served as a creative attempt to remove Dr. King as a 
threat to the system of segregation.  
Governor Patterson intended that the prosecution itself, along with the way it 
was executed, harm Dr. King as much as possible. Dr. King could have faced, and he 
fully expected to spend, up to ten years in prison.  
Notwithstanding the expectations of both Dr. King and Governor Patterson, 
the jury acquitted Dr. King of the perjury charge. The jurors’ reasons remain 
uncertain, but the convergence of two possible explanations seems most plausible. 
First, even though the trial took place in segregationist Alabama, the state’s weak 
case and Dr. King’s lawyers’ strong defense may have contributed to the result. 
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the Northwestern Law Journal of Law and Social Policy Eighth Annual Symposium: Martin Luther 
King’s Lawyers: From Montgomery to the March on Washington to Memphis (Oct. 31, 2014), in 10 NW. 
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Second, the jurors may have shared a concern that a conviction would have risked 
igniting the Black community and threatening the racial stability and relative calm 
that had developed in Montgomery since the end of the bus boycott. The convergence 
of those factors seems to have produced the “miracle” result. 
While the case was a quiet victory for Martin Luther King, Jr., a conviction 
would have been heard throughout the land. While the actual effects of such a 
conviction are unknown, they surely would have had a major impact on both Dr. 
King’s life and the Civil Rights Movement. His acquittal allowed the ordeal to become 
a minor footnote in history. Dr. King was able to exit the courtroom, reputation intact, 
to continue his leadership role undiminished.  
